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This text is a draft of chapter 4 of an upcoming book on explanatory, 
interpretative understanding approaches to social studies in general 
and case studies in particular. 
The first chapter, “Coming to terms”, deals with language, 
induction, deduction and our uncertain grasp of realities, available 
as Working Paper 2005-2). 
The second, “Truth - a concept of imagination with many faces”, is 
available as Working Paper 2005-2. 
The third, “In case of Case Research”, on different approaches 
within social research to generalization, self-awareness and nearness 
to field of study, is available as Working paper 2004-9 (soon to be re-
printed). 
The fifth, on “Explanation”, is nearly finished in a second rough, yet 
whole copy and should be available as Working Paper in the sum-
mer of 2007. 





























 .. every object of knowledge is known – not as a result of its own nature,  
but of the nature of those who comprehend it ..  
Boethius, c 525 AC1 
 
Before we look at the different approaches to social science we have 
first to reflect on the main, although not necessarily exclusive, 
characteristics of research within the human domain as opposed to 
natural sciences, namely: Historical Time and Meaning: 
 
HISTORICAL TIME 
Time is a puzzle. We are too entangled to grasp it. We sense it but 
can neither see nor point at it – not even metaphorically. It escapes 
us, ingrained as it is in our metabolism. It is therefore no surprise 
that time occurs to us in different ways.  
•  Physical time, astrological clock time, - the accumulated sequences 
of time defined by physical units. 
•  Duration, the experienced length of an occurrence, which may not 
concur with the time it took according to my watch. 
•  Historical time a frame of reference for lumping past events and 
changes into an identifiable, cross-comparative, yet often 
slipshod timely order. 
Physical and chemical processes unfold themselves as they do, 
independently of who, when or what initiates them. But my 
reactions to otherwise seemingly similar impacts do change as I alter 
with age. As do our institutions due to the learning processes and 
external changes they have been subjected to.  
•  Some of the natural sciences, especially geology and devel-
opmental biology, use analogies to historical scales in order to 
contain major developments within nature in a, say, chronological 
order.  
                                           
 




Historical Time is mainly a mean for placing events along time lines. 
Or rather it is the events and our aggregated descriptions that form 
historical time. So we get the Middle Age, the Renaissance, etc. to 
which we relate myriads of occurrences as a means to making them 
intelligible! Historical time is thus a way of condensing opus oper-
andi into a frame for absorption of individual social occurrences. 
Thus metaphors like culture, technological development, decay, 
“being out of synch”, reaching maturity etc. are all driven along by 
the concept of historical time! 
Thus the changes in “my” way of perceiving as well as acting be-
come important elements in my biographical life story, my dynamic 
identity. 
Meaning 
Meaning is as slippery a term as time. Furthermore “to mean” – like 
to “see” – occurs in a lot of different combinations, e.g. as 
a)  What does the word <mean> mean”? 
b) To ask: “What does the word <mean> mean”, means trouble! 
c)  What is the meaning of asking: “What does the word <mean> 
mean”? 
Other statements could be mentioned, but these must suffice.  
Re a) The question “What does the word <mean> mean” is an ap-
peal for a clarification of an expression, what it signifies, or a transla-
tion to uncover what a phrase like “to do the uglido” refers to.  
Re b) “To ask “what does the word <mean> mean”, means trouble” 
is a reminder that acts of speech may have, and often are meant to 
have, consequences, in this case perhaps a rebuttal. Or it may just be a 
premonition of what may happen, as e.g. raising tides above 1 metre 
means (read: may cause) a flood. 
Re c) Such a sentence refers to the two previous usages, but its span 
of significance is larger than either of the two sentences above. It 
calls for reference, the potential impact, as well as the importance 
various groups of people might, or once did, assign to a given listed 




The creation and endurance of meaning, a few examples 
Meaning is interlocked in the social. I fell in love with Jane the very 
moment I saw her. Now a sceptic – like an economist or a biologist – 
with hir bird’s eye view on humans, may simplify such a statement 
and state that such an encounter is just an expression of a) my need 
to mate, so b) had we not met we would have met someone else.  
That may well be! But now, after more than 40 years of happy co-
existence, the very moment I saw her means more to me than that. It 
was a turning point in my life as a part of who I came to be. And so 
it is with myriads of other events in our lives; those that acquire 
meaning do so as a result of their consequences. 
Many, if not all our feelings, make sense only within a social realm. 
Take shame: a feeling aroused in us as we sense we have over-
stepped the limits of some Other and thus devalued ourselves in 
their eyes. Whereas anger in some cases may be reduced to an ele-
mentary need for self-defence, shame has no direct biological coun-
terpart as “getting offspring” has for marriage. Shame awakens and 
touches my self-awareness as a social being – as a subject if you like. 
It is not related to me as a male mammal – or if you like an objecti-
fied biological entity – at least not directly.2 
And while anger may be seen as an expression of “biological sur-
vival”, the way I cope with it is socially conditioned. 
A simple example: Little John was seen throwing a stone at another 
boy in the kindergarten, Vernon. The trajectory of the stone is a 
physical phenomenon without any meaning tied to it. But the 
“throwing” means something – both due to i) John’s jealousy of 
Vernon and ii) the consequences it had afterwards when an overseer 
stepped in. Meaning being, intent, bad behaviour, need to learn to 
control oneself, etc.! 
                                           
 
2  Others may objectify any incident concerning me, like ”feeling shame” by 
referring to incidents in my past, say when a parent scolded me for lying. 
Above all what matters to me is not wiser guys hinting at some more or less 
hidden genesis behind my reactive patterns, but the very outbreak of the 




In this sense meaning is a purely social construct inseparable from 
lived life – which of course does not exclude people from assigning 
meaning to physical phenomena like the shape of trees, birds flying 
in from the East,3 earthquakes, comets, rain on a wedding day 
and/or the felt presence of ghosts. 
So, historical time sets a frame in terms of culture, past and present 
and across nations. Meaning is embedded in language usage, our 
sense of existential purpose, as well as our sense of the wholeness of 
life. 
The three dimensions of “Meaning” 
As “we” analyze speech and text, utterances and sentences, at least 
three dimensions will be uncovered. First, reference: We assume that 
utterances or statements are directed at something, that they contain 
an assumed correspondence to an inner or outer reality, past, pre-
sent or what may come. 
Even though sentences are supposed to refer to something, it may 
not be to a real domain outside language – but to other sentences, 
previous thoughts, tales read or beliefs. Thus the alleged correspon-
dence is at best indirect, and if so often untraceable, if not just 
imagined. Yet such statements may still be meaningful as their sheer 
occurrence expresses or may express something about the person; as 
do dance, music and song, where expression is everything. 
Thus, secondly, we – as listeners – may each perceive the statement 
as an expression through which the person airs parts of hir personal-
ity. Say, you tell me “Hannah is short-sighted”, and I answer: “Oh 
yes, thoughtless indeed”. Now you may have alluded to her eye 
condition, while my answer may reveal at least two things, a) that I 
have a low regard for Hannah, b) that I am ready to agree with you 
in order to please you. 
Obviously the evaluation/interpretation of what utterances and 
pieces of text may express is not unequivocal. Nor may the other, 
                                           
 




whose outer signs of his inner state I interpret, agree with my label-
ling, particularly because expressions – like slips of tongue – may be 
unguarded. How expressions are “read” depends, as we all know, 
on context, as well as on the interpreter, hir present mood, pre-
ference for some frames of reference as well as hir own past. 
And worse, the potential for double-references may be used con-
sciously, e.g. as humour, irony and allegories. 
Thirdly, what is said (reference) and how it is said (expression) may 
aim at creating a desired effect on those spoken to. If so, the choice of 
words and how they are expressed will be monitored with care. 
In a later chapter all these aspects will be dealt with in regard to so-
cial research; see FIGURE TTMEAN for a brief reference to some of the 
personal aspects of the interfaces between the three dimensions.4 
                                           
 
4 For some, although less specific, references to previous literature, see e.g. 
Alfred Schutz: Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932). English version: 
The Phenomenology of the Social World, Northwestern University Press 1972, 
page 22. Or Ricoeur: Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences (1981) Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, page 134. Please note that Ricoeur uses other less self-




Figure TTMEAN: THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF MEANING 
 
Images, deeds, talks and 
pieces of text allegedly5 
•  refer to a correspond-
ing outer or inner re-
ality, some-thing said 
or written 
•  express something 
about the inner state of 
the speaker, which 
may be 
•  put forward with an 
intended effect on the 
audience. 
Whether there is alignment between what is referred to and how it is expressed 
is the challenge of authenticity. The tone and speed of voice may here serve as 
indicators – unless, of course, the speaker consciously tries to express himself in 
order to create a certain effect.6  Thus reference and expressivity might have 
intended cognitive or emotional effects on an audience in mind. This is a 
challenge politicians, advertisers and presenters face as actors with a mission of 
their own, and thus they even bull shit!7  
But, as we shall see later in the chapter on the subject of understanding, it is 
worthwhile warning third party interpreters that what “you” was heard to state 
may not correspond to what “you” tried to draw attention to and thus believed 
you expressed. Language is as much a medium for trying to come to terms with 
something as a medium for instruction. 
Nevertheless we, as listeners, may feel tempted if not obliged to search for the 
more or less hidden intentions behind the examples and words chosen by the 
speaker. Just as we – as bystanders to our own behaviour – may ponder about 
                                           
 
5 Refer, for instance, to Wilhelm Dilthey: Construction of the Historical World, #II 
(1) – (4), ((1906-10) reprinted in H P Rickman: W Dilthey, Selected Writings, 
1976, Cambridge University Press, page 218. 
6 As actors know and as linguists like Roman Jakobson remind us, sounds 
matter. Spoken language is richer than written language, see Linda R Waugh 
& Monica Monville-Burston (eds): On Language, Roman Jakobson, Harvard 
University Press, 1990, page 50. 




what the background may be for our own, at times, dysfunctional outbursts of 
emotions. 
 
In this sense, analyzing a text and putting it into perspective will re-
veal as much about the text itself, the man and/or organization be-
hind it, as it may reveal about any reader in general and a social re-
searcher in particular.  
The interchange and interdependence of the three dimensions may 
be illustrated like this: Say I tell you: “I am disappointed”. OK, that 
may be what I feel. But the utterance – even though it may convey 
what I might feel – is meaningless to you so long as I do not refer to 
the (social) circumstances that led to my feeling of disappointment, 
e.g. that I applied for a job but was turned down and hopefully you 
as the listener can recognize the potential for a similar reaction 
within you.  
Thus you would only assign some sense of meaning to what I ex-
press as a result of recognition or at least as a result of imagination 
that you might react like me if you found yourself in a similar situa-
tion. So expressivity may not be intelligible per se. A scene of situ-
ational reference has to be implicitly imagined to set the stage for 
the Other in order to make expressivity meaningful to her too. Thus, 
if I or the Other tries to modify the situational reference, my feelings 
might change accordingly.  
Say you say: “Well, Erik, the job became vacant because Mrs Ash 
hated the long hours she had to devote to administration to main-
tain it.” Thus my disappointment may be replaced with relief, yet 
also some frustration, because I did not take the time to explore 
what the job would entail.  
Or – in order either to save face or to reinstate contentment – I may 
even begin to “invent” reasons for “not really wanting the job” even 
though “I” did apply for it. Such a falsifying reference to what is not 
will “say” a lot about me, which I may not see myself and it thus 
comes at a price: To deny and thus misinterpret my inner reality 
will not help me get a better grip on life. Thus “I” had better face up 




And make no mistake! People that think along the lines of cause and 
effect may reason backwards and say that the loss led me to be dis-
appointed. If so, this would put the cart in front of the horse.8 No, it 
works the other way around! Events may appear in other shapes 
than anticipated. So as I realize that “I” am disappointed I know “I” 
have had a loss. And that is why I may be tempted to use language 
as a means to repair my damaged self-esteem. 
Language as magic 
Uncovering meaning or, as illustrated above, “covering up” thrives 
on language. Thus some claim: “behaviour acquires meaning only 
through language”. This may seem reasonable enough at first 
glance. As we ponder upon what to do – please refer to FIGURE 
CODES, page 55, < WP: Coming to Terms & Truth>, many of us are 
most likely to use words to evaluate the consequences of various 
imaginable alternatives. And if asked why you went to the beach 
yesterday, I expect you to resort to words rather than mimic or 
drawing to convey a meaningful image of why.  
Yet, when I wake up from a puzzling dream, I may first try to draw 
images of it, before “I” use words in order to try to clarify what the 
dream might mean. This shows what we are up against: We use 
words in order to get a grip on situations. And we do it in a myriad 
of ways: Giving orders expecting to create a situation we desire, in-
structing others to help them solve a problem, ect. And when the 
young man declares his love for the object of his fascination, he does 
so in order to establish a mutual bond between them. Advertisers, 
politicians, educators all employ language hoping that the magic 
will work: The magic of creating not only meaning but new realities 
by enlightening or even seducing others or even oneself in turn! 
Thus stating that “behaviour acquires meaning through language” 
is not necessarily wrong, it is just too simplistic. It is more proper to 
state that  
                                           
 




we use language as a sort of magic in order either to come to terms  
with reality or to conjure or to invoke worlds we wish for 
or even assume to be. 
In short we use language not only to depict but also to invoke reali-
ties. And in order to do so, we use whatever means available, be it 
reference, coherence and/or pragmatic arguments, as well as con-
cealment, slander or outright lies. With the nominalist ethos (refer to 
page 21, Coming to Terms) in mind, it is hardly a surprise that re-
ality does not necessarily follow suit to what we tried to talk into it. 
As the magic works, it may at times work against us 
One thing is that we may be deceived by what we hear or worse 
want to hear. Another, that language may engulf us to a degree 
where we can only capture and thus embrace what it allows us to 
talk about; - as if we are held captive by it. To this, though, there is 
an antidote. The more languages you master, the easier it will be to 
distinguish between the span as well as specificity of any signifier 
and the signified. This is strikingly obvious for the rich vocabulary 
for emotions and of being “placed in the world” in German and the 
sparser one in English. 
 
Our world has no meaning beyond what we 
are led to assign to it.  
Language – as an arena for thought experiments 
Realizing the profound magical properties of language as an in-
strument for creating meaning enables us to see how easily we may 
deceive ourselves by face-saving schemes, after-the-fact rationaliza-
tions, boosting oneself to appear better, grander, etc. 
But the magic and relative independence of language vis-à-vis 
reality is also a gift for strategists to play with as well as to explore 
the potential combinations of actions that we imagine could be open 
to us without running any personal risk. It simply gives us an op-
portunity to play with the world by proxy. The imaginary world of 
novels may even appear more real than scores of surveys and classi-




To single out something as significant 
 is an interpretive act, thus all research must be so at heart 
There are no data only interpretations, Nietzsche said.9 This is true 
as far as sentences in a 1:1 correspondence with a non-linguistic-re-
ality are rare, if at all possible. But there is more to it: Just to identify 
some facts as being data is an interpretation of what is meaningful – 
within a given frame of reference. Thus in principle all research is 
interpretative. But as this may cover the former sentence too, let us 
first look at some usages of the term “interpretation” and suggest a 
typology. 
Making sense of the term “interpretation” 
So let us look at the array of schemes available for attributing 
meaning to what we sense or believe we experience, recalling that a) 
“making sense” relates as much to worlds around as well as within 
us and may b) be associated with both positive and negative 
connotations of experience: 
In a positive vein, the term reminds us of at least two facts, which 
may be called our subjective condition, namely that: 
•  what we each perceive and rank as significant is (somewhat) 
different from the next man’s perception, which may be due to  
•  our age, sex and temperament – the biological elements 
•  our job, social standing and personal experiences – the social 
elements 
•  Interpretation is a way of making what occurs in the outer as well 
as our inner world intelligible and meaningful. This requires the 
words that the languages we know contain – the semantic aspect: 
•  We do so by means of schemata ranging from sophisticated 
concepts, routine categorizations to superficial stereotypes – the 
cognitive aspect. 
                                           
 
9 Rephrased from Nietzsche: The Will to Power (1883-88) § 481, Vintage Books, 




•  Yet the reality pressure may at times leave us in doubt as to 
whether this is possible and when it fails, we may either see the 
discrepancy as a challenge to expand our abilities to come to 
terms with reality, the explorative strategy. 
•  Or, if language still fails us, we may try to express ourselves in 
poems, painting and/or musical expression – what we here – 
stuck as we are within language –call poetic imagery. 
•  We may feel frightened and try to escape into mental reparation 
– the bad consciousness aspect.10 
Some state it more simply, though: “Interpretations are the particu-
lar schemata we apply in order to “explain” what happens to and 
around us. This sounds sensible enough, yet it aligns interpretations 
with explanations. And the two terms may indeed be used inter-
changeably in daily speech. Yet, as researchers we have to be more 
precise: Explanations work by rules, interpretations by making 
sense: 
In general interpretation is the fundamental art of 
•  Assigning meaning, including finding a reason or reasons to 
explicate11 why something happened the way it did. 
 
“Finding reasons” implies that interpretations hinge on the ob-
served as much as on what could be observed. Thus an emotional 
outburst in public, which in hindsight may seem meaningless to the 
actor himself, may indeed be perceived as a meaningful expression 
to bystanders. It all depends on whether the observer can place the 
incident within which frame.12  
                                           
 
10 A term borrowed from Existentialism, to be expanded later in this chapter. 
11 To explicate to use the formalism of explanations in order to make what 
really is an interpreation look like an explanation, e.g. assuming a probable 
cause is the effective one. The concept will be expanded later. 
12 This example is an implicit reference to and an adjustment of a dogma due to 
the great Max Weber: Only controlled action done with a purpose can be 




So, whereas Naïve Realism assumes that “what you see” is “what is 
there”, Subjectivism likewise assumes that the meaning you take for 
granted is the meaning. Thus the subjectivist may – just as a thief 
believes everybody steals – believe either that other sensible persons 
must feel as she/he does in similar situations or that she/he – in 
case of disagreement – is the better judge. 
Recognizing that “we all may make mistakes”, subjectivist reactions 
may, of course, like naïve realism, not stand the trial of time. So in 
the context of outlining a case-based research strategy of interpreta-
tion, we may have to be more constructive. Thus I suggest the fol-
lowing:  
Interpretation is  
•  the general use of concepts and other more elaborate constructs, 
including more or less mundane theory-like schemes or 
viewpoints to make the behaviour of nature, societies or other people 
intelligible to ourselves. 
•  in particular constructs applied in hindsight of why people feel and 
act like they do and perhaps even what they try to achieve. 
Interpretations not only assign names to patterns of behaviour, but 
may in addition attempt to elucidate why they are performed in the 
way they are. As conceptual schemes they depend on our idioms of 
the expected, and are thus often guided by our considerations of 
necessary characteristics rather than by a package of what would be 
sufficient.  
So individuals – even when they focus on the same event – will rely 
on either i) one or several favoured interpretations or ii) the only 
one available to them, because their language only allows them to 
apply the one which they were brought up or later trained to use as 
a guide. 
Thus interpretations may be  
                                                                                                                             
 
Mohr 1972, page 12. English Translation: Economy and Society, California 




•  made as a self-conscious, reflective activity; as a deliberate choice 
among several other ways of connecting and bestowing meaning 
into a string of events. 
•  Subjectivist – a spontaneous taken-for-granted fact that you know 
what is going on – the epistemological twin of naïve realism. 
Interpretations are implicitly moralistic 
Whether our interpretations are done subjectively, professionally 
according to pre-set rules or even in a playful mood, it is up to us. In 
short we are responsible for our interpretations.13 Subjectivity may, 
of course, act as a protective shield. But self-denial of responsibility 
may indeed have consequences, as already mentioned. 
Thus we are led to recognize that insofar as social research im-
plicitly draws on interpretations – whether disguised as explana-
tions or not – it is implicitly a moralistic activity.14 
In any case, we had better make our stand explicit, which in par-
ticular is required when dealing with research. We are bound to be 
normative as we advise others what to consider before, during and 
after generation of facts. 
This leaves us with the following program, first  
•  to look at historical exemplars where interpretation is a shared 
term for bestowing/reading meaning into and/or predicting 
events, then 
•  establish some characteristics, including some negatively tainted, 
for interpretative practice, before we  
•  finally settle for a more positive, rich, multi-perspectivist and 
self-observant practice for interpretation that eventually – in a 
                                           
 
13 Refers to ideal truth in the chapter the Many Faces of Truth, page XX. 
14 Refers to this in connection with Explanation: To deny it // can conclude 
from what is to what ought to be/Moore, the naturalistic fallacy// – like 
objectivists who perceive themselves as detached from their own subjectivity 
– would just serve to hide our obligation to others, as if we do not care or are 




later chapter – will move us towards an exegesis of under-
standing. 
 
I pay no regard to the things that are seen,  
but to those that are unseen. 
St Paul15 
Interpretation as a craft – a historical perspective 
Historically “interpretation” is the art of identifying the meaning by 
“seeing” what is at work behind the manifest, as it appears. In par-
ticular “divination” was esteemed16 as what we today might see as 
the cunning to  
a)  recognize the expressed signs of the divine or devilish powers 
working behind the veil of apparent reality,  
b) explain what these signs mean and  
c)  guide us towards the precautions needed to safeguard our 
future. 
And signs there were, everywhere. The augurs of Greece and Rome 
took omens from the type and flight of birds, including the direction 
from which they appeared. To the Greeks, what appeared from the 
right, e.g. a flock of birds, was good, bad from the left. To the Ro-
mans it was generally the opposite. Others, like the haruspices, con-
veyed the will of god by reading the entrails of sacrificed animals – 
liver and gallbladder – in particular. This may seem too fantastic to 
us. Nor did all Greeks17 and Romans18 believe it. 
                                           
 
15 New Testament, Epistle to the Community of Corinth, 5.2. 
16 A form of interpretation by Plato named Hermeneutics, see Epinomis 975.C, 
Loeb Classical Library, Plato, Volume VII, 1955.  
17 See, e.g., Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, ca 400 BC, Book 8. 
18 I am not sure whether generals and sovereigns of the Roman Empire 
generally believed in divination or just exploited it for their own purposes. 
But neighbouring Greek city-states did occasionally fight each other for the 




However too fantastic to be believable, we should not commit the 
Fallacy of Assumed Irrationality and discard what we cannot con-
tain, but rather regard it as a challenge to understand at least what it 
may express. No matter what, expert knowledge of how to read the 
hidden is the prototype for interpretation: The ability to identify 
meaning.  
Dreams too were seen as signs, specifically as messages from the 
underworld,19 which people themselves were believed to be able to 
interpret, and if not, professionals were supposed to be able to help.i 
Future potentialities could be revealed by either a throw of the dice, 
or by focusing on chance utterances, like the sensitivity of Master 
Freud for slips of tongue. Just as the old Babylonian science of as-
trology with profound poetry expressed an inter-linkage of the very 
small - namely our time of birth - with the greatest we know of, the 
universe. 
The early Christians, however, perceived diviners as devil-worship-
pers. Yet Christian culture soon developed an interpretive discourse 
of their own: “Hermeneutics”. Theologians took passages from the 
Bible as a base by which they rephrased contemporary events – as 
they saw it – in their proper moral light.  
The practice was – as they saw it – instituted by none other than Je-
sus, the gracious. After the resurrection the incarnated joins a group 
of two who discuss how the alleged and crucified prophet, Jesus, 
has disappeared and left the tomb empty. Jesus, whom they do not 
recognize, says: “You fools, so slow-witted in grasping all what the 
prophets have declared! Did not the Messiah have to suffer in this 
way before attaining his glory!” And the text continues: “He pro-
ceeded from Moses and the various prophets to explain to them in 
all the Scriptures what related to himself.”20  
                                           
 
19 See Homer: Odyssey, 19. 562. 




This passage endorsed the use of the Bible as an “explanatory” guie 
to interpret whatever happened, including earthquakes21, draught, 
political unrest and sicknesses,22 etc., as expressions of God’s will. 
As such the Bible is seen as allegoric: The texts express some deeper 
layers of meaning beyond the mere account of what happened 
when. If so, the art of theologians would be an effort by means of 
the New Testament to try to make sense out of present events. 
This practice was secularized in the 19th century, and today herme-
neutics is the scholarly discipline of interpreting man-made signs in 
general and writings in particular. So although “hermeneutics” has 
been used in a variety of ways, they have all had the same core: 
“Hermeios” is Greek for a priest at the Oracle at Delphi and linked 
to the trickster Hermes who – as a messenger from the Gods – is 
able to transform what is beyond human understanding into a form 
that human intelligence can grasp.23 Thus we could refine our defini-
tion a little: Interpretation is grounded in bringing something that is 
otherwise unintelligible into a form we can get hold of intellectually.  
Such a transformation can be established in several ways, one of 
which is of particular relevance for this essay: Establishing the right 
context, including a clarification of opus operandi. 
                                           
 
21 The great earthquake in Lisbon 1756 was a turning point for the belief in an 
intervening at times revengeful God, who punished sinners. Yet of course 
several clergymen, including the Danish otherwise sensitive bishop Brorson, 
who still saw God’s wrath behind the event. 
  At that time Lisbon was one of the richest cities in Europe. As the quake 
commenced in the morning of All Saints’ Day tens of thousands of innocent 
people were drowned, burned or crushed to pulp as solid buildings like the 
Cathedral crumbled. In fact, the churches they had sought out for shelter 
were the first to collapse. Most of the visitors to brothels, though, were 
spared, as they were not so solid constructed! Thus – as the contemporary 
Voltaire saw it – the idea that God used nature to meddle in human life now 
was a broken belief. 
22 Find precise reference in N T. 





Today we look at the claims of augurs and the original practices of 
the original hermeneutical art with suspicion. We are more secular, 
true! But I think there is an additional reason: Their verdicts lacked 
coherence. They were “not grounded in the explanatory powers of a 
more or less extended set of comprehensive and at least partially 
verifiable theories”. The war in Iraq 2003-5 was not due to the wrath 
of God. It was a political decision made by President Bush, as head 
of the American “people”! Yet, President Bush may argue he acted 
as the hand of God. Sociologists, however, certainly know better 
and explain the incident by means of criteria developed as generali-
zations from past cases related to protection of resources, concern 
for the safety of Israel, etc. They are more cynical – whether any 
such materialistic stand is more likely as a path to truth or not! 
No matter what, interpretation is still the art of taking and reading 
signs as expressions of an otherwise more profound and hard-to-get-
at reality. A practice we – from case to case – had better look at with 
reservation! 
 
Interpretation – what a wand of magic to make sense  
out of what one does not have the faintest working knowledge of 
Interpretation, negative social practices 
Interpretation as a disapproving term 
It is fascinating how social researchers across theoretical schools are 
apt to disagree on any elementary issue. And while dialogue can be 
enlightening, fighting one’s opponents generally is not. Neverthe-
less, many researchers often feel tempted to bolster their stand using 
various language games in order to belittle others, of which the fol-
lowing is the most simple: 
Many people adhere to some basic statement about the world that 
appears as more proper, realistic or dignified to us than others. And 
with good reason – particularly when shared by our colleagues; 
please refer back to FIGURE CT, page 77 <WP Coming to Terms & 




valid and self-evident. While outsiders – who do not agree with 
“us” – are quick to characterize such sets as ideological expressions.  
In this inconspicuous perspective, interpretation24 is beliefs others 
are prone to cling on. And even though “we” may admit that their 
presentations may not necessarily be completely untrue – it is easy 
for “us” to see how they are interest-infested, politically radical or 
just traditional ways of looking at the world. 
Thus, you will probably see me as an interpreter as long as I appear 
to perceive what matters in the world in a different set of modes 
than you. In this light interpretations may at best emerge as spuri-
ous, amusing or curious, if not biased and/or dangerously self-de-
structive, or at worst used as a term to degrade those who do not 
adhere to the right ways of looking at the world. 
Yet, let us be positive 
While we have to acknowledge the negative or “accusing the other” 
use of the term “interpretation”, we should not adhere to it. We 
should rather use it as a positive term for sensing the world with more 
or less awareness of what we are doing and how. In this sense interpreta-
tion will be seen as an integrated facet of living, which we should 
cultivate and make the best of. So in a positive vein we should 
•  readily acknowledge that we do interpret and 
•  learn to enjoy acquainting ourselves with some of the schemes 
for interpretations available on the intellectual, emotional and 
political markets “of making sense”,  
•  while others may at best make us wonder or  
•  at worst cause us pain as we sense their self-destructive powers 
and thus the harm they may do to others. 
                                           
 
24 Refer to how Jesus above was said to explain passages in Old Testament, 




Thus, rather than defaming alien interpretations we should embrace 
and explore it. So let us start with an apparently straightforward 
interpretative activity: Translation. 
Interpretation as translation 
The cunning Greek god, Hermes, had many responsibilities, one of 
them to take charge of interpretation and in particular the specific 
art of translation of languages. To translate texts across time and 
place may indeed be difficult as circumstances vary. Yet even when 
frame of reference and type of presentation should be maintained, 
translation may be trickier than some might be aware of – as illus-
trated by the following example of the conversion of an influential 




FIGURE BF:  





























liceman for the 
personality26 
Conscious
ness  Ich27 
Here I am, as 
my self 








The drives of a 
child before it 
learns to 
control itself 






The implications of the standard translation into English are discussed in 
the text, yet a short comment may be appropriate: 
“Upper-Me”: The part of me, which makes an inner voice heard as an 
appeal to a higher authority, the genesis of which may be 
•  unknown to the person himself or  
•  accepted as a heritage and identifying part of one’s cultural identity 
•  a self-imposed guideline based on rational calculations, etc. 
Whereas “Super-Ego” as used in English is often associated with  
                                           
 
25 For further evidence see Bruno Bettelheim: Freud and Man´s Soul, Hogarth 
Press, London, 1983 
26 According to Webster’s Dictionary. This may seem to be more of a popular 
reference than a professional one; yet in my mind it does cover general usage 
quite well. 
27 Allow me to bypass the genesis of Freud’s perception of ”Ich” and for those 
interested refer to Malcolm Macmillan: Freud Evaluated, the completed arc 
(1991), Chapter 13, MIT, England, 1997. 




•  self-repression of all kinds. 
 
FIGURE BF illustrates a contrast between two distinctly different ap-
proaches:  
The German terms – derived as they are from Freud’s own intro-
spective analysis – were originally referring to lived life experience 
and consequently terms borrowed from everyday speech.29 They 
thus align the analyzing person and the Other in her custody on the 
same level of dialogue.  
The English terms, however – even though they are presented as 
translations – are given a new twist: They are made technical. Thus, 
they may – by implication – now serve as a demarcation line be-
tween the therapist, as master, and the person on the couch, as a 
client. This “technification” of Freud’s key terms as well as increas-
ing popularity of Freudianism may have helped promote a more 
schematic exposition of the oeuvre of the founding father. 
That something may be lost as well as added in translations of texts 
is trivial. But what I want to highlight goes beyond that: 
Translation, maintaining neither context nor opus operandi  
If the context is changed translations may be disastrous. In the early 
days of machine translation, “The Spirit is willing, but the flesh is 
frail”30 was translated into Russian and then back into English as 
“The alcohol is passable and the meat rotten”.  
Obviously the machines could not identify context set up – as they 
were for translating scientific texts. Thus to exploit this sample as 
evidence for a claim that automatic translations do not work, would 
be an erroneous inference. Transferring Christian concepts to the 
realm of biology and physics is obviously to go beyond context. It is 
                                           
 
29 Although I must admit that it is complicated to read Freud’s Das Ich und das 
Es/ The Ego and the Id (1922) Standard Edition, Vol XIX, page 3-66, Hogarth 
Press, 1961. 




less obvious that the same often happens when an author pretends 
to present the views of a writer – e.g. of an existentialist thinker – 
she subsequently is going to attack. 
Furthermore, imagine how much more may be lost or distorted 
when experiences such as feelings and emotional occurrences are 
converted to text! It is to this conversion of the real into text we turn 
now, as it occurs in social research at several levels – bearing in 
mind how translation from one domain to another is an uncertain 
and shaky conversion. 
No reference, yet the expression 
makes sense nevertheless – the role of poetry and metaphors 
I have mentioned how we make sense of an apparent tautology like: 
“There is a house in Barcelona”, refer to page 46 <WP: Coming to 
Terms &Truth>. So let us look at a Danish expression: “Never is a 
flag as beautiful as in head wind”. In terms of reference this is obvi-
ously pure nonsense. A flag has, of course, to go with wind. Yet 
sentences that cannot be true literally as references may nevertheless 
be meaningful as expressions – provided you can establish a con-
text. In this case the sentence may express admiration for a person 
who keeps on struggling against all odds.  
Translation as conversion 
In research though, ambiguous reference is not allowed, although it 
occurs ever so often. Nor should it be left to the readers to guess 
what a term like, say, empathy might mean. Thus we could extend 
the notion from trans-locating English terms into German ones, to 
translation in general, be it 
•  consciously, as any writer may struggle to find a proper English 
term to express hir inner sentiment while actually having the 
right German word at hand – or if not finding it, to search for 




•  unconsciously, as I just “sense” the body signs of the other as an 
expression of e.g. devotion, amused tolerance or anxiety.31 
Thus interpretation in its broadest sense includes reading signs and 
presenting what is sensed in another medium. Thus the word for 
translation in the Germanic languages is “übersetzen”= to cross a 
fence between domains. 
From seeing signs of the manifest 
to awareness of oneself as an agent of interpretation 
We constantly try to induce meaning into what we sense. Enrap-
tured young men thrive on the smallest sign of appreciation from 
the fairest damsel of them all. We read the weather, take omens 
from what management says knowing all too well that they may 
have hidden agendas. Just as we with delightful indignation at 
times pass our vile conceptions of political occurrences on to others.  
Reading signs is a tricky business; what is expressed may be mixed 
with “image-creating” schemes for talking. Appreciation like for in-
stance: “This is good wine” may appear like an expert evaluation. 
Yet in terms of informational value it just means “I like the taste of 
this”. Thus the intention may very well be to promote oneself as a 
connoisseur of wine. Just as we through our celebration rituals for 
our dead heroes show to the world and ourselves what kind of so-
ciety “we are”. 
“Seeing signs” is so integrated a part of our natural flow of life that 
we may not necessarily be aware of it as we do so. But it is the job of 
fieldworkers to question how we read signs.  
Let’s assume that we observe how a group has a hard time making 
decisions. What may that entail? Furthermore, that the members 
withhold information from and/or even bad-mouth each other? 
Well, we have no guarantee to read it right, as it all depends on cir-
cumstance. Thus we have, step by step, to consider what the ob-
served behaviours may entail! Yet, for illustrative purposes allow 
                                           
 




me to suggest a vague guide for translating occurrences into con-
cepts, see FIGURE TRET.  
 







   
SEEN OR READ AS 
 
Difficulty making decisions 
Conflict concerning 
means and goals 
 
 
Study of memos 
and minutes 
 
Decisions are often altered 
 
Lack of opportunity 








Information is withheld. 
Group members are bad-mouthing each 
other.  
Meetings and interchange are domi-
nated by formality  
 





rules matter, not 
vigilance 
 
+ a high de-
gree of absence 
Potential conflicts, 
not yet acknowl-








Negative attitude as 
well as dissatisfaction 
in general with pro-
duction, planning, 
management, deci-
sions in the past, etc. 







The table illustrates how we use different sources of data in order to 
create a more embracing picture. If so, artifacts, memos, observa-
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tions and semi-structured interviews, etc., have to be combined in 
order to identify, e.g., how often “what” happens as well as to pre-
sent a “why”. 
So, no matter how sure we are of our aptitude for reading signs, we 
can never be certain that we are right. What a sign might signify de-
pends not just on itself but on when and how it occurs in conjunc-
tion with other signs, as illustrated above for the expression of 
negative attitudes. All we can do is to start our search with an initial 
tentative conjecture of what any occurrence might mean. 
Reading signs is by no means simple or straightforward. What 
somebody appears to express may be for effect. Or we may, in the 
course of “reading”, rely on our own subjectivist schemes rather 
than on, say, comparisons across cases. Thus spokespersons for case 
studies again and again emphasize one particular dimension which 
research workers in the explanatory mode rarely emphasize nor 
perceive as a challenge: Self-awareness as a necessary agent of seeing 
and presenting intermediary as well as final texts. Fieldworkers will 
at least soon acknowledge we are invited strangers – that we are ig-
norant. Thus we have to reflect on how far we are able to identify 
what is going on, and thus continuously have to observe and ex-
periment with how we observe. 
We all run the risk of being seen as an ideologically ingrained theo-
rist with a particularly antagonistic attitude to others. This may not 
be the case. But how would you know if you have not even given 
yourself away to playfully experimenting with different schemes for 
interpretation? So, as interpretations can be as self-destructive as 
harmful to others, we have too to keep in mind how the interpreta-
tive art of reading signs may be approached as a conscious guessing 
game. So rather than to identify yourself with a particular perspec-
tive you might be better off by trying to be a curious rascal! 
What we observe may be due to many antecedents, or, as some say, 
causes. Yet we are often all too quick to attribute motives to what 
people do. And we do so with even all the greater ease when we 
look at other people from afar. Thus the educational power of 
nearness! How often have I not - as a case researcher - working in 




showed me how my immediate as well as later analytical interpre-
tations were incomplete! 
Thus we might soften our own ways of discerning or looking at signs 
as an “idea generating technique”, rather than being captivated by 
our self-created interpretations. This we will return to in the last 
chapter dealing with research on the understanding mode. First, we 
have to recall how interpretation may be coloured by choice of con-
text: 
The part and the whole, 
the challenge of choosing a context for interpretation 
A text in the hand of others may lay itself open to more interpreta-
tions than the one the author imagines. It is not uncommon to see a 
text explicitly written with one purpose in mind, being twisted by 
an analyst to state the opposite. And this may not even be the result 
of an outright malignant strategy or personal drive, but merely be-
cause the analyst has placed himself in a context he favours, as il-
lustrated in FIGURE PWHO, which depicts a number of strategies for 




FIGURE PWHO: PARTS AND WHOLES: TRADITIONAL IDEAL-TYPICAL FORMS 
OF RELATING TEXT IN RELATION TO A CHOSEN WHOLE  
A TEXT INTO A 
GRANDER CONTEXT 
BITS OF AN 




FOR A CASE STUDY 
ANALYSIS 
A) 
Relating the elements 
of the text to the text 
at large, on the 
premises we believe 




crete elements in the 
interview to the in-
terview at large 
 
 
Search for consistency in in-
formants’ use of key concepts 
or for a pattern in his choice 
of metaphors 
B 1) 
Relating the text to 
what we know about 




view to the personal 
background, educa-
tion and present po-
sition in company 
and/or community of 
the informant  
 
What aspects of organiza-
tional life does any speaker 
stress and which does he ig-
nore, be it economy, need for 
control, participation or 
customer perception of com-
pany? 
B 2) 
Relating the intention 
we believe the Other 
might have had for 
producing it (effect 
angle) 
Relating what is said 
to the effect he might 
hope to create as e.g. 
a politically conscious 
being 
 
What image of himself does 
he seem to promote. Can we 
relate this to observation 
studies and/or the perception 





Relating the text to 
the particular time 
and culture in which 
it was produced 
 
The interview taken 
as an example of how 
a middle manager in 
a Danish, medium-
sized company in a 
rural area in West 
Jutland evaluated the 
challenges in 2004 
C 2) 
Relating the text to 
the traditions and 
other authors he re-
fers to for inspiration 
as well as those he 
write up against 
The interview as an 
expression of the 
challenges and di-
lemmas facing super-





Case studies of selected com-
panies are placed as an illus-
tration of the concerns and 
actions taken across, say, US 
manufacturing industries 
through the transition period 
in the early 2000s and com-
pared to the national strate-
gies chosen elsewhere 
 
In case A) please refer to FIGURE PWHO, the analyst assumes 
himself able to dissect the text in front of him regardless of who 
produced it when. This, of course, must be done be in a certain way 
– linguistically, argumentatively or with a more personal outlook, as 
when texts are read for personal enlightenment.  
B 1-2) exemplifies two avenues, often chosen by a literary critic who 
wants to “explain” how a given author worked and why.33 The last 
approach, C 1-2), exemplifies the integration of texts often written 
by others as mere props for cultural enlightenment. 
Relating parts to a whole is, of course, not limited to textual analy-
sis. And as this essay is particularly devoted to empirically based 
social research, I will confine myself to a sketch of interpretative ap-
proaches to primarily human behaviour, including speech-acts. 
Thus I regrettably have to bypass interpretative studies of artifacts, 
historical texts and ancient paintings, etc. 
                                           
 




At last let us recall that the choice of context is not the only way we 
set the scene. Whatever we notice as well as choose to bring to light 
depends on the perspective chosen, as well as what we focus on. 
Interpretation as a self-conscious 
reflection of sincere identification and/or suspicion 
Traditionally the drive for interpretative activity was – as we recall – 
getting “behind” appearances in order to uncover and identify what 
is lurking behind surface reality. We read behavioural signs all day 
long, just as we plan our own appearance for effect. Commentators 
interpret the words and actions taken by political figures, just as the 
social sciences teach us to look for clues and analyse them. So we 
rather abstain from using interpretation as a derogatory term and 
stick to interpretation as a positive endeavour, acknowledging that 
a)  we do it all the time, although it may at times be unknowingly. 
Thus 
b) we may do ourselves a service by realizing when and how we 
interpret, which may lead us on to the track of why and what is 
leading us to act as we are inclined to. 
c)  Our sense of others as well as ourselves may even become 
broader, if we experiment with different interpretation strategies. 
This in turn may 
d) sensitize our awareness of what others are likely to identify as 
meaningful to them.  
Awareness of the “Other” does not entail that I have to appreciate 
the interpretations that “I” see other groups of people adhere to, 
particularly not when they – as “I” see it – are in bad faith. But I 
must be ready to face the likelihood that any evaluative position of 
mine may reflect my own views, rather than the reasons the others 
tend to use to explicate why they perceive the world as they say 
they do. 
Thus two fundamentally different attitudes to the Other may be ex-
pressed in an interpretation, either 
•  an identifying approach through which we try to “put ourselves 




to act as she does. This does not mean that we necessarily would 
act like the Other, nor look at her actions with sympathy, but we 
can at least in an imaginative form recognize some inclinations 
within ourselves that could lead us to, say, give ourselves away 
to a power figure, steal or collect beautiful artifacts, rape, etc. 
Such identification will, of course, always be partial as neither of 
us know all about the Other, nor about ourselves. 
Or 
•  a distancing, if not outright mischievous approach of suspicion - 
ascription of socially harmful motives to particular persons 
and/or groups – be it due to their alleged stupidity, 
“brainwash”, greed, some other malign, self-promoting interest 
or just bad faith.  
The identifying approach may be beneficial to both parts. While 
some – like me – may be suspicious of the suspicious approach and 
will be on guard to explore whether it may be a projection: transfer-
ring the expression of undesirable forces that we do not want to 
admit to possessing ourselves to others whom we then look at and 
treat with disdain. Yet the opposite, an identification approach, may 
be equally dubious if sympathy is grounded in a hidden wish for 
identification with a – let us say – power figure.  
 
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO SPAN, LEVEL 
AND SELF-AWARENESS 
Awareness of context, perspective, is as essential as the need to dif-
ferentiate between the social sciences with each their focus on per-
sons, groups, organizations or even culture. In short we need to re-
late our interpretations to a self-defined level and span of pro-
claimed or at least expected validity. 
The challenge of classification – introducing level and span 
It is a challenge to present a short, yet comprehensive typology for 
interpretative practices across different domains. After several at-
tempts, I have primarily settled for level and span, but I might have 




LEVEL is here – as in general systems theory – defined as degree of 
aggregation. 34 Culture studies represent a higher degree of aggrega-
tion than say social-psychological studies of groups. Level may thus, 
too, metaphorically be read as how many life dimensions a given 
science tries to cover and read some aggregated order into. 
SPAN refers to the extent to which a given principle of interpretation 
and/or theory is claimed to cover. For instance materialism has an 
alleged greater span than, say, behaviourism. 
Scale is here defined as a particular type of span when a given inter-
pretation is applied across domains, including instances of mal-ap-
propriation of terms. 
Focus refers to a more limited area or number of cases to which a 
given interpretative principle is expected to be applicable. While 
span and scale are more or less sketchy, focus will attempt to outline 
opus operandi. 
In the following chapter on explanations we have to add another 
dimension that might be used to characterize interpretations: De-
gree of specificity concerning when and how a claim can be applied. 
For this chapter an implicit reference to specificity will suffice. 
Level, span and focus are all aspects of the art of generalization 
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FIGURE LEVRAN: LEVEL AND SPAN 
 
Level refers to the 
degree of theoretical 
aggregation. “Culture – 
sociology – psy-
chology” is a popular 
three-tier social 
structure. 
Readers may observe 
that no room is left e.g. 
for economics as a 
discipline per se – this 
is debatable and will be 
discussed later in this 
chapter in relation to 
Institutionalism as well 
in the next chapter on 
Explanation in relation 
to emergence. 
 
Three levels are neat, but one might also try to work with e.g. a seven-tier structure:  
“History –culture – sociology – social psychology – personal psychology – neurology 
– biochemistry. 
Span refers to the degree of coverage we expect from a theory. Or we may just focus 
on a set of local constructs based, e.g., on research from one field. 
 
Levels are relatively easy to define by means of the classifications 
used in each type of science, but for empirical analysis we usually 
need to move across levels. Studying how teams organize them-
selves in a high-tech company, we cannot, e.g., ignore the culture or 
type of economy it is embedded in. While the focus in this case will 
be on social psychology, the sets of higher-level aggregations will 
serve as background. Nor can we focus on a given culture without 




Level and span, a closer look 
As we have to distinguish between different levels of interpretation 
we have to suggest a number. Here I have, just as an illustration of 
the idea, settled for three for social research: 
•  Minute level: Strategies for interpreting the behaviour of 
individuals – our own, the behaviour of those we meet, hear 
or read about in the course of everyday life. – The psychological 
level, you might say. 
•  Mid level: Interpretations meant to cover the behaviour of 
groups working together and/or aggregated traits of persons 
in certain jobs, including partial postulates about the essence 
of a selected social institution, for instance the function of 
social institutions like marriage, “giving gifts”, un-
employment benefits, etc. Also called the anthropological 
and/or sociological level.  
•  Grand level: Interpretations relating to highlighting and 
defining the characteristics and inner workings of greater 
social figurations, say Peasant Armies in the Middle Ages, 
Renaissance Culture or the Modern Democratic State, the cul-
tural level. 
Secondly, various sets of interpretations may claim to cover various 
breadths of span. Like rational choice theory assumes to cover a 
broader span than consumer behaviour theory. So allow me to 
suggest this taxonomy:  
•  Narrow span, interpretations that purport just to cover a small 
sample of concrete incidents at hand, say paedophiles’ peculiar 
attraction to children. 
•  Mid span, interpretive practices claimed to be valid for what love 
is in general or the commonly shared features of organizations 
and institutionalized life. 
•  Broad span, all-encompassing, powerful postulates on the 
fundamental nature, essence and/or drives of for instance a man, 
institutions, societies, nature, life and/or the godly.  
Thus level relates to the “extent of aggregation” of what is charac-




Some ad hoc interpretations primarily at the minute level 
Interpretations may be made on the spur of the moment or with de-
liberate self-conscious awareness. The first just comes to us; the 
latter we have to learn. Let us therefore first look at some of our 
spontaneous ways and means through which we try to make sense 
of everyday social life. On this level, our interpretations consist 
mainly in 
•  Labelling, assigning names to occurrences – you check what you re-
cognize is detectable by others as well – or just appears to be so to 
you and 
•  Outlining relations between occurrences, be they perceived as real 
or symbolic,35 and what releases them. By some called 
identification of causes. 
Among the mass of minute interpretations of everyday life, allow 
me first to select and comment on a few of particular importance to 
social research in general and fieldwork in particular: 
•  Attribution of motives 
•  Projections 
Attribution of motives 
 – from overall, ad hoc to more substantiated practices 
For nameless years, reference to providence was, not least by 
churches, taken as the grand master principle operating beyond all 
sorts of movement, historical as well as everyday events from thun-
der to the sickness of a grandfather. This served several purposes.  
One is personal resilience: We may not know why something hap-
pened, but if it is God’s will, so let it be: Do not meddle with that. So 
it stifled curiosity with the same implicit message as Stoicism: “Do 
                                           
 
35 Any word in a text is real in the sense that it is printed or can be uttered. Yet 
in everyday terms a word is expected to be a symbol with a reference to 




not occupy and trouble yourself with what you are unable to con-
trol. Just turn to life and do your own best”.   
So let us just take a closer look at such an interpretation as a “figure 
of thought”. One might say that God is too comprehensive a concept 
to “explain” all sorts of minor stuff and thus a violation of categories 
across levels. But that might trample on some people’s feelings. So 
let us pass over that, because there is more at stake. The claim impli-
cates that everything, as it occurs, does so for a reason.  
The belief that occurrences happen for a reason or a purpose is as 
old as man’s first efforts to come to terms with nature. So when 
asked, we had better – if we want to prove our worth – be able to 
present a reason for the course of events. To present and “show one-
self able” to explicate has such a powerful grip on the western 
mindset that we tend to more or less automatically drum up reasons 
when asked. 
How fascinating to follow the cunning with which a three-year-old – 
having sensed the magic of language – can present explanations for 
everything. Say, the milkman is late: “He’s kissing a lady!” Or the 
airplane fell out of the sky: “The pilot just fell asleep!” Children are 
so fascinatingly quick to invent probable reasons in order to make 
the world intelligible, which they without any notion of shame 
triumphantly present to others. Language certainly has a magic of 
its own beyond saying: “Let it be”, refer back to page N50N<-!  Yet 
we had better take this as typical examples of our ability to produce 
ad hoc interpretations.  
The ability to present causes is an integrated feature of everyday 
language games. We might for instance claim that the “behaviour of 
a lecher is due to his thirst for women”. Now this alleged explication 
may merely exist within language itself as a tautology – like “All 
bachelors seem to be unmarried”.  
Yet there may be more to it, however: I may have my own reason 
for explicating the behaviour of a lecher as I did: I may occasionally 
have recognized inwardly how a passing female may tickle me 
sexually. So even if what I state is a tautology, what “I” express is an 
implicit reading of the Other, based on emotional occurrences I 




This exemplifies interpretation in one of its most common forms: A 
probable cause, an intention or a drive we recognize from within 
ourselves is put forward as the only one. - The fallacy of insufficient 
specification or misplaced opus operandi!  Because, as already stated, 
what we observe may have a plurality of causes.  
Secondly, even though the statement parades as an explanation, it is 
not, as the effect comes before the alleged cause. “We search for 
something in order to state why something is as it is.”36 If reference 
to “motivation” is to make sense - not just as an expretationii  but as 
a scientific term – we must be able to establish the “existence” of 
specific inner drives independently of behaviour. An alleged cause 
is just an “after the fact invention” and thus only acquires validity by 
sheer appearance. 
Motives we attribute to others do not necessarily exist apart from 
being forces we imagine at work within others in order to make 
their actions intelligible to ourselves. Thus the examples given in the 
previous FIGURE TRET, page 22, have to be tested by additional 
fieldwork and reference to opus operandi. So, let us just accept 
“motivation” as a tentative pattern by means of which we – according 
to contingent circumstance – may make a first educated guess as to 
what is at stake. 
Why does the lady in the yellow dress abstain from eating unlike 
the rest of us around the table?” “Oh, she is not hungry!” Oh yes, 
that makes sense! Yet she may - for all sorts of other reasons - 
abstain from eating even though she wants to. She may, e.g., be 
fasting in order to test her power to resist her carnal appetites. We 
will only know why, if we ask her, and even then she might want – 
in order to protect herself – to just give us an answer she reckons 
will be effectively acceptable for us. 
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Intent and/or disposition 
So we attribute motives to other people. They may be very specific 
and may relate to a situation at hand, intent, or they may be more 
general, as a disposition to act is believed to be contained within the 
other. A sketch of some of the varieties of inter-relations is exempli-
fied in FIGURE ATSEQ.1. 
 
FIGURE ATSEQ1: AN ATTRIBUTION SEQUENCE 
Consider the following sequence: John tells Louis that Ricky has belittled him. 
Louis feels slighted. This in turn may lead to a three-step attribution sequence: 
0: An effect is perceived, the feeling of being slighted 
1: An immediate cause is identified as something Ricky has done and 
2: A reason is provided: Ricky intended to hurt Louis' reputation 
3: This may lead to a more comprehensive aggregate “explanation”. Ricky is 
attributed a general trait that may hint at how he will act in the future. “He is 
a mischievous sot”.   
4: Thus, in hindsight the effect and what caused it is interpreted as a conse-
quence of Ricky’s general disposition. This will most likely colour Louis' fu-
ture perception of him. 
 
Please note: Nothing is said about 1) Louis' general disposition as to how he 
may see himself, nor 2) which motives John could have had as a messenger! 
Why? Because the logic of this drama implicitly depicts Louis as an injured 
part! To be continued in FIGURE ATSEQ.2 
 
The ease with which we move from reading signs to interpretation 
is fraught with pitfalls, especially as the certainty of having found a 
reason all too easily clouds the need to look closer at opus operandi.  
In FIGURE ATSEQ we, for instance, ignored to attribute any charac-




worlds intelligible is all too often stronger than our inclination to 
explore. It may even be a question of decorum not to! In addition, 
“just for the occasion”, ad hoc interpretations have their own re-
ward; they enable us to appear as if we know what is going on – at 
least to ourselves. 
This may have dire consequences for social research, but let us first 
take a further glance at our practices. 
Man as a self-interpreting entity 
Man, as an “I”, has been subject to many definitions and there will 
be more to come. One is to identify ourselves by what we do, func-
tional identity, or by the direction of change we perceive taking 
place within us, dynamic identity.37 In the first case we attribute iden-
tity to what we do, our job, how we usually react, hobbies or what 
we have achieved, place of birth, exams, etc. By dynamic identity we 
refer to ourselves as persons in movement. 
Both types have advantages as well as disadvantages. One has to be 
honest as to where we come from, but to cling to a certain outlook 
just because you were trained as a lawyer is, of course, a self-limit-
ing amputation, in contrast to being on the move and open to other 
analytical perspectives. 
Secondly, self-interpretation by means of identification with goals, 
acts and dispositions may lead to confusion, if not delusion. Say, 
yesterday I told you that now I was going to stop overeating. Yet, 
now you see “I” just bought a chocolate bar! So, obviously “I” do 
want to eat more than I want to! “We” have all caught ourselves 
doing something we have decided not to do. Thus who are we then, 
really? And as the proof is in the pudding, purpose and act can only 
be separated in theory, not in practice.  
What “we” “really” want is expressed in our actions. But if so, who 
is the “I” in the sentence above? A divided “I”, certainly! Some “IA” 
want to give me away to eating, another to make “me” stay away 
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from guzzling. So “I” am a battlefield of IN´s, as Gestalt psychology 
teaches us. So, isn’t all your talk about say, “wanting not to,“ just an 
invocation from one “Me” to persuade another “Me”? And in the 
example stated, the magic apparently did not work!  
It is when you see what you actually do “you” will know who you 
are and what you want as a person. You may eventually be led to 
stop fattening up, but persuasion merely by words is weak 
voodoo.38  
Thus the images we make out of ourselves, either as we are or want 
to be, cannot necessarily bear a reality test. Language is an all too 
convenient playground for beliefs, but of course, nor could we in-
struct and guide ourselves through change without it.  
 
Intent is too intimate .. to be more than approximately interpreted by another.  
It even escapes self-observation .. We constantly explain acts  
due to petty feelings or blind routine by 
generous passions or lofty ideals 
Durkheim39 
Self-attribution and laddering as an example of enforcing it 
Despite the ease with which we attribute motives to others, we may 
– if asked seriously – hesitate to state our own. Instead “we” would 
rather – if given the time and space – with strong emotional depth 
give you an account of critical incidents in our lives from which we 
later took guidance. Yet, westerners are brought up to be respon-
sible and thus expected to be accountable. So we - divided I's or not 
- are supposed to be able to produce reasons for what we do if just 
asked. This is amply illustrated by the following game drawn from a 
social research practice: 
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Laddering is an interrogation technique primarily used in marketing. 
The researcher exposes a consumer to a string of why-questions for 
buying certain products. He states a reason, say, for amusement 
making an impression on health. He is then asked why amusement 
is important to him. He offers a reason on top of the first, which the 
interrogator asks him to give reasons for. The continuous flow of 
“why's” creates a pressure to answer, the aim being to lead the 
object to indicate a string of “values for conduct of life” related to, 
say, the buying of bread.40  
However dubious the technique is as a reflection-inducing method, 
it more than amply illustrates our social readiness to attribute quali-
ties to ourselves. For an illustration, consider two incidents of series 
and responses to statements and questions:  
A)   “No thank you I do not eat greasy foods!” Why? “I want to stay 
slim!” Why? “It is better for my health and sense of well-
being!” or 
B)   “Chocolate”? “Yes thank you, I really should not!” Why? “Be-
cause I am on a diet .. !” So? “.. but what the heck, it tastes so 
good!” 
Re A) With reference to FIGURE LADD, wanting to stay in good health 
is a raison d’être we all – if asked – should expect an interviewer to 
accept as reasonable. So it is a good answer! As are all the other an-
swers given in the laddering interviews I have seen. Thus the inter-
viewer is left high and dry. Laddering does not enable him to as-
certain whether “health” “really” is a concern for the interviewee. 
To do so he had to explore whether the interviewee smokes, drinks 
alcohol, exercises, etc. The “laddering-answers” ought just to be 
taken as ad hoc. At best laddering just “measures” what people be-
lieve they ought to say, rather than what an independent observer 
may “measure” by going, say, through their trash cans. 
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FIGURE LADD: REASONS GIVEN AT AN INCREASINGLY HIGHER LEVEL OF 
ABSTRACTION FOR A PURCHASE, ACCORDING TO LADDERING 
 
Laddering consists of 
asking a person a series 
of why-questions. This 
should result in a means-
end chain: product char-
acteristics, consequences, 
life values, like:  
•  Identified product 
characteristic: 
Organically grown 
vegetables are free 
from pesticides. 
•  Personal consequences: they will be healthier for me to eat than the 
alternatives, 
•  which I prefer, as I value staying healthy. Furthermore, it makes me feel 
good to help preserve nature (personal commitment to goal). 
Two “values” are hinted at here: staying healthy and feeling good, but a 
third possibility is indicated. When asked, most people will be able to state 
at least one reason why they bought a product, although they bought it on 
impulse.  
Laddering exemplifies how we, when asked, are able to present a, at least 
by appearance, coherent relation between our actions and what they mean to 
us. Had the product characteristics, however, been specified and related to 
others, the result might have resembled the model outlined in FIGURE 
CODES, page 55 <WP: Coming to Terms &Truth>. 
 
Furthermore, staying healthy and feeling good are not necessarily 
independent values, as the latter may be a consequence of the first. 
To be reliable, the search for vertical coherence has to be supple-
mented with horizontal coherence.  
Re B) Next, and this is indeed more serious than the methodological 
issues, let us look at why laddering is a recommended technique in 




Some believe soft drinks are “harmful”.41 Now, whether food that 
contains sugar will make you fat depends on the rest of your diet 
and how much you eat. What is important in this context is the ten-
sion we might feel between a short-term drive for immediate gratifi-
cation and a long-term goal of slimming down. We live in an econ-
omy where industry can produce far more than we westerners can 
consume. The challenge is therefore no longer to provide for our ba-
sic needs, but to get goods sold.  
This is where laddering comes in: If being with others is shown to 
be valued, industry is hereby given a tool through advertising to 
persuade consumers to buy for short-term gratification. An effect, 
openly admitted by some laddering experts! 42 
Thus instead of helping us to improve our self-control in the long 
term, business schools may instruct their students to employ tech-
niques that may undermine the efforts of any citizen that tries to 
achieve self-control, in this case staying slim and fit. Thus the di-
vided “Self”43 is left to fend for itself, and at times people may see 
themselves do something they know they will regret, as the short 
perspective runs counter to planned behaviour in order to achieve 
long-term goals, please refer back to FIGURE CODES, page 55 <WP: 
Coming to Terms &Truth>. 
Thus, in accordance with the idiom of looking at ourselves as if we 
were rational creatures with a positive self-image as a contrast to 
what we really do, we have all the more reason to present socially 
acceptable reasons for our actions to a stranger. Any darker side of 
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43 Self is here used as a figure of speech for the embodiment of the multitude of 
“Upper Me's”. “Me's” and “It's”. Thus I do not here bet on the existence of a 




emotional life, such as jealousy, hardly ever rises above the surface, 
and if they do, only as projections.44  
Self-attribution, as illustrated by “Laddering”, does not necessarily 
imply knowing, it may imply biased presentations of oneself as a 
rational creature driven by positive motives rather than twisted pas-
sions and an inclination to counteract feelings of inferiority by 
means of expression.  
Yet, searching inward for reasons could – if conducted in a more 
self-reflective mood – open some doors to our inner arena of contra-
dictions.45 So, if we really want to study what drives people, in-
cluding the troubles we have of balancing our drives, we should en-
gage in a dialogue with each other in a quest for vertical and hori-
zontal coherence, as well as triangulating what the Other says about 
her motivation with reflections on what she sees herself doing. But 
that is another story that will move us towards the final chapter on 
understanding. 
The Other as a reflection of ourselves 
Attribution is, in its most naïve sense, driven by the assumption that 
“my sense of the internal life of others is accurate”, – a position we 
have already referred to as subjectivism. Whereas naïve realism re-
flects the assumption that what I see is what it is, subjectivism re-
flects the assumption that I can sense the inner drives of the Other as 
already illustrated.  
Subjectivism may be broken down into at least two stands, one of 
identification and one of dissociation, namely 
•  that the Other is a human being like me, thus she will feel like me 
when exposed to similar situations. 
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•  that while some “Others” are like me, while others are radically 
different and driven to act in ways that are beyond me. 
Recognizing oneself in the Other may indeed be naïve. Yet in terms 
of solidarity it may be of great practical value. This is why we 
readily donate money to the havoc-stricken unknown. To imagine 
what I would feel if I, say, lost my job, gives me an idea of how it 
might hurt any Other, etc. 
Nevertheless, we should not – and especially as social researchers – 
let ourselves be guided to assume that we know what happens to 
and within others. Understanding is not to be built just on naïve be-
lief, but on reflection and checking. And with reference to laddering, 
how can we assume to be able to get under the skin of the Other, 
when we tend to glamorize our own inner life when asked to state a 
reason for our own acts? 
As for believing in the Other being different, the risk of making 
mistakes is even greater. Despite the ideal of the neutral researcher 
so dear to Positivist and/or Logical Empiricists, no one but God can 
assure us that we are free from the vices and shortcomings we be-
stow on others. So let us first look at the darker side of transference 
of motives. 
The worst of all deceptions is self-deception 
Socrates46 
Projection 
Among the more malicious forms of attributing motives to others, 
projection is a prime example of what bias entails. For the upkeep of 
our own respectability we tend to overlook aspects of our own be-
haviour, which would otherwise hurt the idealized self-picture. In-
stead, we bestow the darker aspects of ourselves on others – par-
ticularly on people we have a reason to dislike, say because they ex-
ert power over us.  
                                           
 




As a result politicians, managers and colleagues are often targets of 
transference of grim dispositions, like overzealous ambition, greed 
and contempt of others. Of course, we cannot just offhandedly 
evaluate to which degree any defamatory remarks are well 
grounded or a projection. One should always try to be sensitive, 
search for additional clues and remember that targets for projections 
may indeed display the characteristics attributed to them. Thus the 
“projector” may not recognize how she possibly exaggerates the 
clues she identifies, nor how blind she may be to some more posi-
tive characteristics, which could also be attributed to the person or 
persons in question.  
Managers may face to face express their annoyance with workers 
who do not pay attention to what they are doing, who are sloppy 
and just want to get as much out of their day with minimum effort. 
A little later the same manager may stress that her central contribu-
tion to the company is process optimization – that is getting the 
most out of production with the least investment. But is that what 
the workers on their part want too?  
And if the workers may be blamed for not seizing the initiative and 
are not given the abilities, nor room to make a difference, is that 
necessarily just their fault? Have the manager and her colleagues in 
management set up “problem identification groups of employees” 
and openly made themselves vulnerable to criticism?47 Is the man-
agement prepared to share the benefits of running a business with 
the shop floor? Or do they merely take pride in how much money 
they make? If so, they apply different standards according to whom 
they evaluate. Apparently, by necessity, projections are partially fo-
cused.  
Of course, the bright interviewer can bring a manager to recognize 
such a discrepancy. But it takes a lot of heart to do so. It may indeed 
be an unpleasant “here and now” experience to face up to one’s own 
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projective attributions, just as it is rewarding when digested, en-
acted and looked back upon. 
Bad conscience  
Bad conscience is a particularly vicious type of projection. Here the 
Other is not only debased, but punished for what one unwittingly 
neglects. In the eighties, the emergence of case studies in a qualita-
tive vein was met with hostility from established experimental and 
survey-based researchers – for several reasons, of course, which 
were not all equally flattering for all qualitative approaches! Some 
studies were and are indeed still too sloppy. But I am sure that per-
sonal sense of uneasiness with quantitative methodology was part 
of it too! 
Curiously it was not my colleagues in the data processing and sta-
tistical department who tried to impede my involvement in and 
teachings of dialogue-based case studies. The primary obstruction 
came from the Dean of Research who was devoted to the paradigm 
of measuring attitudes by surveys and statistical analysis. My insis-
tent demand for respect and need to let “people express them-
selves” seemed to touch a concern that his approach had to neglect. 
As if “scientists” have a special right to subject others to their vo-
cabularies!  
So in order to avoid facing up to a potential inner unease, the Dean 
felt that he had to fight the person that triggered such an uncer-
tainty. A hostility that lingered on as a personal dislike as more and 
more PhD students, even from his own department, began to attend 
courses in qualitative research, including mine, and he accordingly 
had to become more tolerant. Apart from the bad conscience I here 
attribute to him, it is evident that since I aroused his wrath rather 
than his sensitivity, I failed too. 
Examples of bad conscience are bountiful and may include majority 
cultures' collective defaming of minorities, e.g., White Protestants 
against “Natives” in the Colonial Era, Males towards Females, or 
Israelis against their, in a genetic sense, “Palestinian Brothers”.  
While the other is hurt, we ourselves may even have a price to pay 




negativity to the Other. It undermines one's own ability for sense-
making. So managers, as they go around the golf course trying to 
close a deal, are at no pains to agree that workers are lazy and will 
do everything in their power to get a day off. Thus they undermine 
any need they could otherwise have felt as to what they can do in 
order to improve the performance of their companies. 
Finally, we may mention how ideologies often – in their judgmental 
appearance – may appear as an epitome of bad conscience, as when, 
in the late seventies, bourgeois youths at Western universities em-
braced the ideology of Marxism. 
The fallacy of assumed irrationality 
But let us finish on a lighter note. Let us look at a situation where we 
are faced with certain types of people we certainly do not sympa-
thize with, nor can we imagine them to be like us in any way, say 
the Communists of Cambodia, the Christian slave owners of the 
past, or the suicide bombers of today. Here we may opt for at least 
three alternatives: 
•  Either stating that it is beyond conception that anyone can behave 
like that, or 
•  that in order to present oneself as a knowledgeable person, one 
may come up with a reason by e.g. introducing analogies, or 
•  claiming, that the Other is irrational. 
Now, first: It is absolutely fair as well as honest just to state that “I 
do not know why and how they act like they do”. This keeps the 
door open for further search, whereas the second position closes it. 
The second option is dubious, although, if done with awareness, it 
may serve as a starting point for further inquiries. 
The third, though, is tragic. To deny the logic of what one cannot 
contain is a luxury that social researchers hardly can afford! The 
very fact that we fail to see any reason for the actions of another 
does not mean the other hasn’t any reason, as if it is the “Other's” 
fault that you cannot contain him! So stick to what you do know, 
face what you do not know and do not indulge in the fallacy of as-




Consequences for social research 
Minute interpretations aim to establish a background that let us be-
lieve we are able to infer why an identified event or series of events 
occurred as it did. 
Interpretations may be obliviously naïve, ad hoc, consciously fo-
cused on certain aspects rather than others, or done with the playful 
self-awareness of a try-out. In the latter case of open-minded, ex-
perimentally focused interpretations we talk about an indicative ap-
proach, as illustrated in the previously presented FIGURE TRET.  
Let us assess: How can we be sure to be able to produce an insight 
of what is going on within others, what the other person is trying to 
do and with what effect in mind? As long as our interpretations all 
hinge on either recognition or denial of what we could recognize 
within the Other, it seems as if we are condemned to our own sub-
jectivity. In principle, Yes! But there is more to it, which we as social 
researchers have to be painfully aware of: 
Obviously we should abstain from attributing motives to anyone 
just by appearance. Surveillance is necessary, but not sufficient. 
Watching must be supplemented with a personal report of the 
Other. Yet even that may not be enough. When confronted most 
westerners will be able – as they are expected to – to give an “after-
the-fact explication” (or rather expretation) of their actions, as illus-
trated in the case of laddering. 
So if we really want to know – given that we do have a license – the 
way forward is long-range observation and dialogue, helping peo-
ple to explore and get acquainted with their inner drives. Coming to 
terms must not be done in a slipshod manner but approached with 
care: Aiming for coherence through analytical generalization, inte-
grating new evidence with identified patterns and search for poten-
tial consequences may sensitize us to identify what we have failed 
to grasp, as indicated in FIGURE ATSEQ.2 below. 
Thus, the best way is double-listening: Listen to and testing the 
Other as well as oneself: Bringing our subjectivity to the test, and 
checking our perceptions of the Other by, e.g., presenting our 
interpretations of what we perceive and conveying them back to 




anything either. Yet, disagreement is a clear sign that further search, 
and especially dialogue is needed. Dialogue, thus, is the gateway to 
more grounded insight or perhaps even understanding. A challenge 
we will deal with later. 
 
FIGURE ATSEQ.2: AN ATTRIBUTION SEQUENCE, continued 
In figure ATSEQ.1, page 52, we neither considered John's role as a messenger, 
nor Louis' sensitivity.  
 
So let us 
repeat: All we 
know is what 




mouth Louis.  
Maybe John simply used the magic of language in order to create a double ef-
fect: Making Louis feel slighted and in consequence arousing his anger against 
Ricky so they together can attribute him with mischievousness. If so, the tables 
are turned. First John makes Louis feel bad. Next he and John agree to make 
Ricky bad. This in consequence makes Louis feel good. Language is indeed 
magical! Words rule the day. They, as the social constructivists preach, they 
shape the social!  
But the consequences may go further than that, as Louis may maintain an 
emotional scar, although the incident that caused it may soon be forgotten. 
The lesson for case studies is clear: All parties in a sequence have to be paid at-
tention, listened to and their statements analyzed in relation to track records of 
past incidents. 
 
Summing up our conclusions so far 
With a reference to FIGURE LEVRAN, minute interpretations are 
applicable within the domain of interpersonal interchange, ranging 
from common-sense attribution of motivation to the every-day 
behaviour of the Other, to research-based psychological schemes. 





•  Minute-level interpretations may work through the transfer of 
inner drives, which we sense from ourselves, to others (attri-
bution), regardless of whether we are ready to recognize such 
drives as part of ourselves or not (projection). Yet, 
•  we cannot be expected to know what others are up to, nor what 
drives them. The case of the fasting woman shows us how 
dangerous it is to attribute motives we know from ourselves to 
others. In every case many inner drives as well as outer 
stimulations may be possible.  
•  Nor can we just rely on self-reports, particularly not when these 
are done in a slipshod manner, as documented in the case of 
laddering.  
•  Remember, there are no clear-cut relations between self-pro-
claimed attitudes and expressed behaviour. When confronted by 
researchers with an unknown agenda, the easiest way out is to 
whisk him off with a series of pleasing, politically correct answers, 
as most consumers tend to do when asked whether they buy 
ecologically acceptable food. Furthermore, as demonstrated by C. 
Argyris, managers may not even know whether their theory of 
action is compatible with how they actually behave.48 
•  So, we should avoid feeling forced to choose between two per se 
inadequate sources of insight! If anything, we might see the 
tension between words and deeds to be as fascinating as a subject 
in itself;49 
•  as well as personally recognizing the fact that one of the high 
roads to greater self-awareness and change is to become aware of 
the discrepancies between our self-proclaimed image and actual 
behaviour.  
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With this in mind let us move on to schemes of attribution for more 
aggregated forms of social behaviour on mid-level. 
Mid-level interpretations 
Whereas explanations deal with how social institutions are estab-
lished, develop and change both functionally and structurally in 
time, the domain of mid-level interpretations are more geared to 
impromptu analysis of how and why social institutions operate as 
we perceive them to do – be it political parties, governmental de-
partments, the judicial system, unemployment schemes, marketing 
departments of industries, IT-based productions control, etc., in-
cluding postulates of the essence of the nature of any selected social 
domain. Thus, while minute-level reasoning relates to psychological 
issues, mid-level thinking tries to explicate the operational raison 
d’être of entities of more integrated, encompassing social or socio-
logical domains. 
Schools of mid-level interpretations span from the most, more or 
less, manifest to the most abstract, such as: 
•  Aggregate theories concerning our positions and behaviour as 
socialized beings, e.g.: 
o  Reference group theory: which simply states that we all take 
“significant Others” as a reference and/or guide for 
evaluating our own performance and that we explore the 
consequences, including hero worship.50 
o  Social stratification51 and social mobility: Sets of guidelines for 
differentiation between social groups, based on, e.g., 
economic, educational and occupational criteria, including 
span of control over other people. Rules are often supported 
by empirical data of how various groups view each other in 
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terms of say, status. Social mobility theory, i.e. use of statistical 
data, shows how selected groups of people ascend or descend 
relative to other groups in a social hierarchy as regards, e.g., 
technological changes. 
Theories from these two theoretical domains may be used to “expli-
cate” why the emotional strain of being fired is so much tougher 
compared to being laid off, even when the economic consequences 
are the same. Or they may be used to explicate how trained opera-
tors to an increasing degree opt for middle-class norms. This opens 
up for theories related to: 
•  Generation of social norms – sets of principles for the ongoing 
changes of conduct in various population groups as history 
changes. 
•  Cognitive Dissonance Theory – an even more abstract principle, 
which, according to Festinger,52 states something like: If reality is 
felt to be in dissonance with our thinking, we will feel strained. 
One way out is to re-define our goals in ways that will diminish 
the felt discrepancy. Thus “Cognitive Dissonance Theory” in its 
abstract format may include several other, more specific 
theories, as illustrated in FIGURE COMMID.  
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FIGURE COMMID: SELECTED MID-LEVEL THEORIES MAY BE INTEGRATED 




By making theories increasingly ab-
stract, like “Cognitive Dissonance The-
ory”, they may be seen to include se-
veral more concrete theories with each 
their specific references to opus oper-
andi. Thus giving the Theory an air of 
universal validity at the loss of refer-
ence to applicability. 
For reference to a concrete example, 
please refer to Maaloe 53 for how 
complacency may work as a 
psychological self-defence for workers 
without much control of their 
livelihood. 
 
In conjunction with the two principles already outlined, Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory may be used as a frame to outline possible 
coping strategies, including those of emotional appeasement when 
confronted with a loss: Either, and worst, to propel us towards pro-
jective fantasies as a falsifying safeguard of a wounded self-image – 
or, at best, serve, e.g., as a push towards a more realistic elaboration 
of our situation, or if said theoretically, towards analytical generali-
zation.  
Thus mid-level interpretations may outline 
•  Allegedly broad theories that combine individual performance 
with emergent social or biological demands. Allow me here to 
mention two examples of such typologies: 
o In a long line of books Adizes has identified four types of 
organizational decision-makers: The producer, P, with an eye 
for short and mid-term affectivity. The administrator, A, with 
                                           
 




an eye for efficiency. The entrepreneurs, E, who take long-term, 
often quite new, initiatives. The integrators, I, who get people 
to cooperate and help them find their own means of solving 
challenges facing their parts of the firm (facilitation). This 
simple, yet catching typology may – when combined with the 
traditional model for the growth, maturing and decay of busi-
nesses – be developed into a strikingly rich description of re-
quired role leadership in different situations.54 
o Erik Erikson’s model of the eight stages of man is a prominent 
example of how far a rather simple typology can go. It de-
scribes how our orientation towards life changes as we grow 
and the conflicts that each stage may contain, please refer to 
FIGURE ERIKS. 
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FIGURE ERIKS: THE STAGES OF MAN ACCORDING TO ERIK ERIKSON 










To hold and to let go  Autonomy – Shame and doubt 
pre-schooler  To go after and to play  Initiative – Guilt 
     
school age  To complete and make things 
together 
 




To be oneself or not, and to 
share 
Identity – Identity diffusion 
early 
adulthood 
To loose and find oneself in 
Others 
Intimacy – Isolation 
     
adulthood 
 
To improve and to care for  Care – Self-absorption 
older 
adulthood 
To be, through having been  Wisdom – Disgust & Despair 
The chart is a simplified integration of Erik Erikson's own presentation55 with 
an emphasis on aspects that might serve us well within the confines of the pre-
sent text. Erikson’s work is a well-founded reminder of the insufficiency of 
simplified models of man as an economically rational or sex-driven creature.  
Our aims in life change as we grow and the radius of our significant relations 
change from mother to both parents, basic family, neighbourhood, peer groups, 
partners in friendship, labour and shared household and lastly, in old age, “my 
kind of people”. 
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Mid-level interpretation claims to show how different types of 
people and social institution function on an aggregate level, whether 
by necessity or more or less on their own premises. 
Let us take a closer, albeit sweeping, look at some of these: first, in 
an apparently sense-making approach, secondly, an outright ideologi-
cal approach, thirdly, at examples of analogical thinking, particularly 
transference of thought schemes from biological and technical 
sciences to social “science”, and finally I devote a few words to sta-
tistic generalization as a follow-up from <WP: In case of case re-
search>. 
Functionalism (1) 
Organizational departments may – like our jaws and teeth serve us 
as a grinder – each serve a purpose: sales, production, instruction of 
employees, etc. And like some of our organs, the heart for instance,56 
some of the departments may, while serving the whole, nevertheless 
be semi-independent, e.g. the research department. 
The above examples state something about how or why57 a chosen 
social entity functions the way it does. “Functionalism” extends this 
scheme to social institutions – like unemployment benefit schemes, 
industrial plants and marriage rituals. Unemployment benefit 
schemes are for instance devised to maintain the population’s pur-
chasing power thus keeping industries running, as Keynesian 
economists will tell you. Functional theories state the purpose of a 
selected social institution, which may serve as a guide for perform-
ance evaluation.  
So, as car engines propel us forward, the purpose of prisons is – let 
us say – to punish and keep delinquents off the streets – just as the 
juridical system is there to ensure fairness and justice. So if you are 
mischievous, you might say that functionalism thrives on the meta-
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phor of the machine, or better an organism. This may seem reason-
able enough. Social institutions serve a purpose. Right? 
Yet there is only one snag in it: We do not necessarily agree what the 
purpose is. Some claim that the purpose of prisons is not punish-
ment but revenge, while others opt for re-education. And indeed 
social institutions may serve a multitude of functions. 
A lot of reasons have also been attributed to unemployment benefit 
schemes, ranging from Christian concern for the impoverished, so-
cial solidarity, need for a surplus army of hands to keep labour costs 
down, etc. Some of these may at certain times have had some rele-
vance. Yet the “surplus army” concept for one is obviously outdated 
since very few jobs in the West can be filled without years of initial 
training. 
So what at one time may have served a particular goal for an insti-
tution may later have come to serve other purposes, including its 
own survival, as we see for bureaucracies. Thus the sheer attribution 
of a function to a social institution is not sufficient to state why it 
“exists”. It requires something more, as we shall she when we come 
to the next chapter on “Explanation”. For now it will suffice to state 
that functionalities we as readers of newspapers attribute to 
institutions may at best be naively ad hoc, at worst presented with a 
hidden political agenda. 
This calamity is easily reinforced as researchers, confined within 
each their own discipline, often favour one type of functional ex-
pretation,58 rather than others, e.g. “it is all a question of power”, as 
if the same principle is lurking behind any event worthy of their at-
tention.  
                                           
 




How nice before any interviews,  
observations or experimental analysis to know what really matters 
Conflict sociology – as a brainchild of Marxism – may serve as an in-
structive example of an over-extended, broad span and thus rather 
ideological abuse of the functionalist idiom.  
Adherents to this scheme instruct us to look for the heavy hand of 
management suppressing workers. And, surely, oppression of em-
ployees does exist. But as discussed in the Employee Owner, unions 
have, especially in the past, been as much part of the subjugation 
process as management. Alignment of their union members was, as 
they saw it, a defensive strategy against exploitation.  
Now, it is all right to be on watch for the trace of the exploitive hand 
of venture capitalists and management. But do not assume it lurks 
as the only driver behind any introduction of expansive educational 
programs, profit sharing schemes or even employee ownership! It is 
good to be guided by expectations, but not – regardless of what 
management does - to have the conclusion given beforehand! Allow 
me in passing to mention that is was in order to reject such “Truth 
before Looking” methodological strategies that led Glaser and 
Strauss to formulate their case study methodology, Grounded 
Method.59 
 
Now this suppression ideology may be bad enough in itself but the 
opposite view, the vulgar Darwinist approach to Liberalism, is even 
worse as it opts to legitimize the power of the more gifted to exploit 
the weaker by stating “that ’s Nature”. An idea, that is controversial 
for an array of reasons: 
First of all, this is not what Darwin said. Animals are let to use a lot 
of survival strategies. According to your own temperament, you 
may - as your ideal pattern for society - choose the lone tigers, the 
pack of wolves, a flock of chimpanzees or the cooperating beehive. 
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Thus with such a multitude of examples of “survival strategies” to 
choose from, the one you prefer may rather reflect your own subjec-
tivism than the richness of reality.  
If this is not enough, Darwinism accentuates a challenge, which the 
modern spokesperson for “evolutionary biology” still neglects: 
Natural selection of “evolutionary biology” purports only to explain 
how some life forms are screened out. It does not give us rules for 
when and how new life forms may emerge. Evolutionary biology 
contains only a negative principle. Oh, it’s due to chance, mutations, 
as it is called. But appeal to pure chance exemplifies the fallacy of 
the principle of assumed concreteness, in this case by making a 
principle out of one’s own ignorance.  
So we had better either wonder or opt for the rather poetic 
Bergsonian concept of “Elan Vital”60: “In all matters of life there is 
an inborn tendency to multiply and increase sensitivity”. Whichever 
way, Evolutionary Theory in itself still has only come halfway to 
completeness and thus remains an interpretation! 
So neither conflict sociology nor the Darwinist approach to Liberal-
ism, brothers in arms they are, amount to more than over-expanded 
interpretations; often it is perhaps more an extension of the person-
ality of the claimant than of reality in all its richness. 
Analogical transference of conceptual 
 scheme from hard sciences to the realm of social interpretations 
Throughout history philosophers have been inspired to take the most 
advanced technology of their day as an idiom for the inner structures of 
man, society or even the universe, as the mechanistic clock in the 
Church Tower was taken to symbolize the structure of the universe. 
Examples include Plato, who modeled his “world of Ideas” on 
geometrical reasoning; Schelling, who made chemical transforma-
tion an idiom for social revolution, and Freud, who took the hydrau-
                                           
 





lic force of a steam engine boiler as a picture of the pent-up pressure 
from unreleased psychological force.  
Such schemes of transference across domains may indeed be 
enlightening as they offer us a new perspective. Yet, they may be 
narrowing too, as the focus they advocate necessarily leaves some-
thing out of consideration. Thus the price cognitive psychology has 
to pay for taking the computer as a paradigm, is to be led to 
disregard the whole realm of feelings and emotions embedded in 
our body. And while there have been attempts to embrace them, 
those I know of are strikingly inadequate, which some, like Lazarus, 
with delightful honesty openly admit.61  
To see the universe as nothing but a grand mechanistic clock or hu-
man consciousness as nothing but a bit-by-bit feedback structure are 
striking examples of reductionist interpretation that comes up with 
a solution before the problem is thoroughly explored. 
Statistical correlation studies 
 – a prime example of interpretations geared for mid-level  
By necessity statistical surveys and analyses take place on mid-level, 
and many mid-level theories do in fact refer to statistical evidence. 
The essence of statistical analysis is the idea that all secondary, min-
ute individual details any member of a group may possess will 
“counteract” each other in the multitude of samples – “the law of 
great numbers”. Thus statistical analyses like mid-level theory aim 
at uncovering generally identifiable traits of well-defined groups. 
So, could statistical analysis be interpretative? Aren’t they purely 
descriptive? Well, descriptively, the figures in themselves “just” 
present different degrees of co-variation amongst selected variables. 
Of course, one can stop here, but then nothing is gained apart from 
the presentation of rows of numbers. No! The numbers intrigue us 
to make sense out of them.  
                                           
 




Let me here interject that I respect the diligent care which the very 
best makers of surveys put into the control of the effects of their 
wording of questionnaires. However, until recently most have been 
more than sloppy with wording the questions or fall into the trap of 
measuring what they can measure rather than what they say they 
want to measure, for instance measuring absence, rather than 
dealing with the array of other indicators of dissatisfaction such as 
slander, mistrust, carelessness, work slowdowns and wrench 
throwing. Nevertheless, even the most elaborate mathematical 
treatment of data cannot hide the fact that surveys build on 
interpretation. 
Combining mid-level schemes and theories 
As already illustrated, theories at mini-level, see FIGURE 4.1, page 29, 
<WP: Coming to Terms &Truth>, as well as mid-level, refer to 
FIGURE COMMID, may be combined. But mini- and mid-level theories 
may too. 
We have just mentioned the rather abstract notion of “Suppression 
Theory” as well as the somewhat more concrete notion of “Social 
Mobility.” Now let us focus not on those who move up, but stay put 
and try to make the most out of Festinger's principle: If so, we may 
get a sense of how, and the unfortunate could exploit the magic of 
language to psychologically comfort themselves by ruminating 
about “how far better off ‘we’ are, since ‘we’ are not among those 
rich people who have acquired their wealth by exploiting others”.  
Or take the concept of “élan vital” as a drive towards sensitivity. 
And idea which - as I see it – is a poetic extension of traits from what 
is closest to us – our own maturing to a greater perspective, the 
biological evolution. 
Characteristics of interpretations of mid-level studies 
Interpretations at mid-level represent selected perspectives that in 




occurring events. Thus they have to stick to a format that can serve 
as guides for empirical inquiry.62 
Methodologically they represent 
•  Integrated statements for social behaviour with 
•  an assumed coverage across otherwise seemingly different life-
styles due to low levels of abstraction.63  
•  The central claims are neither subtle nor sophisticated and thus 
easy to apply, especially because 
•  the basic concepts are often so well outlined that they readily 
can be subjected to statistical identification64 and enumeration, 
and thus 
•  may be combined into statements of co-variance within the cho-
sen domain. 
•  So, various mid-level principles may often be combined to form 
more specific theories. Sometimes even in combination with 
minute. 
•  Yet, however inspirational, we have to be careful. Despite 
overexpansion and at times flagrant neglect of opus operandi, 
proponents often present mid-level theories of interpretation as 
explanatory. 
The dividing line between minute and mid-span 
At first glance it is not as easy as one would expect to draw a di-
viding line between minute- and mid-level principles of analysis. 
Either may be abstract or concrete. Projection – the idea that we 
might refuse to accept a latent dark side of our personality instead 
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of attributing it to others – is as abstract as discrepancy theory, 
claiming we will try to remedy any felt discrepancy between what 
we do and believe by adjusting how we think about ourselves. Also 
the span of possible motive attributions to any other may be vaguely 
conceived as the potential possibilities for bestowing functional 
identity to say, prisons. 
Yet here is a profound difference. Whereas minute-level principles 
for discerning primarily relate to our concrete existence, mid-span 
principles are more concerned with social realities of identified 
groups, organizations or social institutions at large. The individual 
manager as a person has no place in Adizes' typology, just as con-
flict theory cannot embrace the devotion of any retiring owner who 
transfers a lump of his shares as ESOP capital to his employees.  
Finally, mid-level theories may in themselves absorb some minute-
level theories as part of their build-up. Thus projection may be seen 
as an example of a coping tactic in accordance with discrepancy the-
ory.  
With this in mind and particularly as we recall mid-level theories' 
prominent neglect of opus operandi, we have to take a look at how 
mid-level theories may be extended into broad-span principles. 
Broad-span interpretation on the mid level 
Festinger’s theory exemplifies a broad-span integration of several 
theories across several domains of thinking – and even, at times, 
levels. And so may “Suppression Theory”.  
To go broad is a temptation for those who, when facing any new 
situation, like to do their best to offer an interpretation that seems to 
fit their basic conception. Some students of political science are thus 
glad to interpret any move by a political party as a quest for or ex-
pression of power. – Just as an economist may stake his reputation 
on his belief in man as a rational attendant to his own interests.  
The cult of the rational 
It is indeed fascinating how many a theorist so committed to be-
stowing power or selfish motives to others may not see any need to 




so egotistical. No one seems to think about me”! How intriguing; we 
do not necessarily believe we share the characteristics we bestow on 
others, not even the group we belong to! 65 
Could we imagine a believer in rationality who would ground his 
pleasure of watching and playing with his grandchildren on sheer 
calculation? If confronted – regardless of observations like those of 
Eriksson, refer to FIGURE ERIKS, page 54, – he might state this is his 
way of securing their devotion when he grows old enough to need 
their care – as if grandchildren aren’t a pleasure in themselves!  
Apparently, it is the rule of today in the western world to pay lip-
service to calculation and self-interest! It is as if our mind is stamped 
by the great breakthrough of the cult of the rational in the late 18th 
century, when social thinkers were so proud of their abilities to un-
mask religion and other ideal conceptions of man and his strivings 
within society. Nietzsche, for example, saw Christianity as a form of 
collective defence of the weak against the individual expression of 
the independent, stronger-willed person! And Freudianism and 
Marxism – especially in their popularly known forms – strived to 
show us that “it is all a question” of sex or exploitation.  
Thus broad-span interpretation should always be approached with 
care. To claim rational calculation, procreation, sex and/or power to 
be the essence of the social intercourse may thus be seen as an over-
blown, out-of-level-transference of minute-level conceptions to 
grander.  
But let us first look at two of the most persuasive forms of grand-
level thinking: 1) beliefs concerning life in general and more mod-
estly, 2) the unravelling of patterns of social institutions across cul-
tures. 
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Broad, grand-level interpretations usually consist of a fundamental, 
often ontological claim about the essence of nature, the social world 
or the human conditions at large. Among such sweeping convictions 
about the fundamentals of life we may refer to:  
•  Materialism: All that exists is material entities in varying physical 
and chemical states and relations.” 
•  Vitalism: A term to denote how life is endowed with spirit – as 
opposed to “dead matter”.  
But grand-level thinking may be less ambitious and merely deal 
with  
•  identification of cross-cultural patterns. 
 
As a supplement to ontological stances, broad-span social percep-
tions may embrace epistemological issues too, one of which is more 
challenging to our perception of our own personal identity than 
most, especially as we will deal with understanding later: 
•  Structuralism 
Allow me – for the sake of exemplification – to take turns with just 
these three types: 
An ontological challenge: Vitalism and Materialism 
Vitalism: A doctrine claiming that there is a fundamental difference 
between the living and the inanimate. The living is more than an ac-
cumulation of material parts! What is alive has a soul, matter does 
not, as Aristotle taught, refer to FIGURE 4, page 47 <WP Coming to 
Terms & Truth>. Regrettably, the Christian Church only bestows 
this honor to man. Yet in neither case do we get a notion of what the 
soul is. It is just stated that it is. 
So, Vitalism is indeed a vague ideology, but nevertheless extremely 
important as a carrier of an expressed feeling of respect for all living 
matter – formerly as animism, today as an ecological concern for the 




Buddhist as well as Hindu visions of life - extend to include a vision 
of the Earth as the embodiment of the parthenogenic goddess Gaia. 
As an ideology, Vitalism was originally formulated as a reaction to 
Materialism as it emerged during the nineteenth century. Material-
ism is simply the ontological claim that everything that is, is com-
posed or carried entirely by the matter and nothing else. Material-
ism is thus a negative principle with an affirmative side. It denies 
that anything exists beyond the physical. Mind and consciousness, 
including religious beliefs, are just a question of movements in mat-
ter. How this is possible is “just” a challenge for science to unravel.  
As a programme for science, materialism is sometimes called 
Naturalism,66 which has driven man to the frontiers of human 
mastery of knowledge – the outer limits of astronomical space and 
the inner spheres of atoms and molecules, while its contribution to 
the social has been less illuminating, if not outright devastating for 
our respect for the unknown Other!  
Vitalism is based on sentiment, Materialism on the intellect. Unfor-
tunately proponents of either view seem more driven by a desire to 
reduce the views of their counterparts to narrow-mindedness or 
confused make-belief, rather than seeing the other view as a source 
of inspiration for research and policy-making.  
This is a pity, because even though the two views seem to appear as 
opposites, they are not. It is hardly possible to define materialism in 
a way that does not per implication contain a reference to the denial 
of spirituality. So while Materialism excludes Vitalism, Vitalism in-
cludes matter. 
Ideology and grand theory 
Broad-span perceptions of reality particularly at the grand level are 
often linked to what we hitherto with a loose hand did call ideology. 
And so may some mid-level views, like suppression theory, be. 
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Now, ideology is as slippery a term as interpretation. “Ideology” may 
denote 
a)  the body of conceptual ideas behind a given scientific domain or 
be used as 
b) a degrading term to defame a body of ideas that a powerful so-
cietal elite adheres to and wants the rest of us to honor. 
Personally, I would prefer to use the term in the impartial way and 
leave it to those who use the term as a negative characterization of 
other views to include their own. Yet, this is, I believe, too much to 
ask for. 
Thus I suggest we call any cluster of more or less coherent ideas and 
beliefs a doctrine. Doctrine is the positive expression for ideology in 
sense a) referred to above. 
 
According to the “principle of an inner seed of truth”, which will be 
launched in the chapter on understanding, I will grant you that if 
not all ideological claims then at least those I know of contain some 
truth as do most narrow and mid-level theories. The material exis-
tence of our body, its needs and fascinating physiological processes 
of interchange are as evident as are our vital striving towards com-
petence, fulfillment and spirited awe for life. Yet as some claims are 
defined in opposition to others, they cannot all be true across any 
span.  
Thus, rather than wasting our energy in denial of the truth in other 
views, we may serve ourselves better to be on the lookout for what 
any view may inspire us to get a better sense of. 
Rejection has consequences. A materialist may be right in rejecting 
the most fanciful versions of spiritualism, yet the price may be that 
compassion for and/or responsibility towards the other is sent 
down the drain as well. Materialism as we know it in the West 
represents not only an anti-Christian, anti-religious stand, but often 
even an anti-social sentiment as the straight-minded, who assum-
ingly knows better, prefers to see it. Unfortunately not without due 
reason, as many religious systems are founded on broad-span con-




Thus in our interpretation, it is the denial of the main tenets of other 
competing doctrines that defines a system of beliefs as an ideology 
rather than as a set of potentially enlightening perspectives. With 
this presentation of what may rank as a doctrine in itself, let us turn 
to two more mundane examples of less than grand-, but still high-
level aggregation: 
Grand-level identification of cross-cultural patterns  
By implication grand-level interpretation must be directed towards 
highly aggregated conceptions of the social. Be it identification of 
cross-national or cross-cultural patterns of private and public insti-
tutions – the identification of the background for and the inner de-
velopment of revolutions – or the best policies to foster economic 
growth. Let me just mention two such examples: 
In his cross-cultural studies of empires, Eisenstadt sought to identify 
the circumstances in which state bureaucracies break down.67 A 
study that builds on samples spanning across cultures that are more 
different in type and time than most cross-comparative studies of 
pattern matching I know of. His samples include Sassanid Persia 
224-642, the Byzantine Empire 395-518, the T’ang Empire of China 
618-907, the Spanish-American Empire 1493-1898 and Absolutist 
Europe ≈1400 – ≈1900.68  
Eisenstadt starts by identifying two forces at work within societies: 
the general rule-setting by the government and various more or less 
free-floating sub-sections of society, like various religious institu-
tions, industries and commercial enterprises and trade patterns. As 
his point of departure Eisenstadt states that any administration has 
to orchestrate the interplay between a) the ruling elite as the centre 
of power with its tendencies to impose its political goals on all and 
b) the more or less independent sub-systems at work within the 
state. Now the main finding of his study is the following:  
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In over-zealous bureaucratic empires, the contradictions in the re-
spective orientations and activities of the rulers and their major 
supportive institutions may become so strong that they undermine 
the basic conditions and premises for the state to function. This 
happens when the central government imposes too rigid strains on 
the flow of free resources, e.g. production, trade, religious worship, 
censorship, recruitment etc.69 In other words: If you want to rule all, 
you will end up ruling nothing.  
 
Likewise, but with a far more limited scope, Brinton sought to iden-
tify when to anticipate revolutions and how they would proceed.70 
He based his analysis on a sample of four western cases: England 
1640, America 1776-89, France 1789, and Russia 1917-21. By pattern-
matching he identified the following ideal flow:  
First, a preliminary stage of internal tension between different strata 
of society – a bitterness that is enforced if people across strata are 
acquainted with each other – say between a ruling military class, 
landowners and business. “One” does not fight a distant, “untouch-
able” upper class.  
In the initial stages the intellectuals next withdraw their support for 
the government, the bureaucracy struggles but loses control as it ab-
stains from using or is unable to use the necessary power to stifle 
the unrest.  
The ruling class yields and government is transferred to a group of 
moderates. The reforms they implement are too slow and temperate 
for the extremists. So the radicals seize power. In three out of four 
cases the moderates are incarcerated and killed. Violence escalates 
to terror. The rule of the radicals becomes increasingly centralized. 
And a new order is installed. So the process that started as an outcry 
for greater freedom ends in curtailing it.  
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At least these four revolutions seem to be of the same type, revolu-
tions in what may be not too uncritically called the democratic tra-
dition, Brinton finally points out thus trying to establish some preci-
sion of opus operandi for the identified flow of events. He also notes 
that there is an internal similarity within them: “They exhibit an in-
creasing scale of promises to the common man” … promises that, in 
their extreme form, were not fulfilled.71 
 
The two cases we have brought up are instructive in several ways. 
First, grand schemes obviously must limit themselves to sweeping 
statements about societies and their general characteristics. Yet, 
what they lack in terms of specification, they gain in assumed 
universality. While Brinton is able to identify the aspirations and 
doings of some key actors, Eisenstadt, with his grand scheme, 
hardly ever – apart from figureheads of state – mentions a person by 
name.  
Secondly, the two cases can be read in succession. Despite their dif-
ferent scopes, they do indeed supplement each other. However, my 
initial sense that they both may be read as an ideological praise of a 
liberal economy has never left me. Thus I have at times used them 
accordingly. 
With these few words, let us finally turn to a grand, if not the 
grandest, epistemological challenge for those who, like me, nurture 
a deep-seated notion for the real: Structuralism. 
The challenge of a grand-level epistemological scheme: Structuralism 
Allow me at the outset to state that I am utterly convinced that the 
basic claim of structuralism, as we shall see, is true in the sense of 
being verifiable, if not outright inescapable. The issue I aim to raise 
is whether it is an all-encompassing truth! 
Despite what is commonly stated the greatest challenge researchers 
are facing is not subjectivity. That may be revealed if we compare 
                                           
 




our more or less automatic interpretations with those of our fellow 
citizens. What colours our perceptions of life more than anything is 
the culture and time we were brought up in, the occupations we can 
envision, the ethical and scientific norms we were taught to adopt. 
Amongst these inherent reality structuring rails, let us within the 
confines of the present essay primarily take a further look at lan-
guage. 
Words captivate us more than we generally are ready to acknowl-
edge. A word may now and then intrigue us. Yet in their plenitude 
words live within us with a naturalness we seldom dispute. We live 
by what we can name and thus conceptually manipulate as well as 
express our inner emotional life. Some words may fall out of use 
and new may be introduced. But fundamentally, languages have 
persistence far beyond our own lives.  
Furthermore, due to the inner coherence of languages, they even 
seem to have a life of their own. The meaning of any word listed in a 
dictionary is determined by reference to other words. Thus they 
may prevail without any reference to a language-independent real-
ity. This self-contained reality has dire consequences: We may ex-
change words without necessarily understanding – e.g. in terms of 
lived experience – what oneself or the other is talking about. This is 
amply illustrated by the computer program ELIZA72 as well as this 
example: 
My kid brother Sven of 9 and I were at a family dinner. During a 
break in the conversation Sven suddenly cut through saying: “Oh, 
what a piquant taste”. The adults smiled enjoying the praise thus 
bestowed on the hostess. She herself radiating with satisfaction. 
Sven, while pleased with the reaction, was puzzled. Before anyone 
had a chance to say anything, he continued: “What does piquant 
actually mean”? Obviously, while he knew the meaning of the word 
in terms of effect, he had no idea of what it referred to. And surely 
you can go far just by indulging in verbose streams of words as long 
as they seem bound together by some notion of coherence. 
                                           
 




If so, what “really” exists in terms of durability is – as stated in the 
Middle Age – not people but language, or in general terms the so-
cial! We are just like drops of a wave that carry language with its 
variety of interwoven patterns forward with minute changes we 
need not be aware of. 
Each science, each research tradition, yes each system or domain of 
thought has its own inclusive inter-woven sets of concepts and ideas 
we have to acknowledge in order to speak it. Thus what students 
have to prove, exam upon exam in order to pass, is that they can, 
say, talk like a proper economist. Accordingly, the prevalent meta-
phor for “to study” is not to explore a field, but “to read”.  
This sets the frame for a grand theory, Structuralism. Which fur-
thermore sets a grand challenge for those who want to believe it 
may be possible to reach others as well as express ourselves without 
not just letting words carry us away. 
 
Structuralism grew out of linguistic and literary73 theory to embrace 
the social. Language is a system of signs with a permanence of their 
own. And the difference between them, say residence and abode, is 
explicated by using other words, which themselves refer to other 
words, none of which in any obvious ways can be connected to 
what they might signify.74  
Originally, some written signs may symbolize a reference, like in 
Chinese “West” is depicted as the image of a sun setting behind a 
tree, refer to FIGURE WEST. But otherwise, neither the sound nor our 
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spelling of “House” has more likeness with a shelter than “Mouse”. 
It is long forgotten how house came to signify what it does. It is a 
convention that children just have to accept, along with grammar 
and other rules for combining words. Language is a system of 
signs.75  
 




In some languages letters were once based on symbols, like d 
originated out of a triangle for delta, Δ. And some are still sym-
bols like West in Chinese depicted like a sun setting behind a 
construction or into the sea. Very poetic, indeed! Unlike the pic-
tograms which now– with the increasing number of travellers 
without knowledge of the local vocabularies – are popping up 
everywhere in the public domain! 
 
In contrast to naturalistic painting , there is hardly any  
correspondence between words as signifiers and what they signify. Names are 
conventional, or, as we might say, arbitrary,76 as a result of historical processes 
we, apart from a few exceptions, do not know of. 
 
That is hardly controversial. Or is it?  
Structuralism at least takes us further than just claiming, that “lan-
guage is a system of signs”. It claims that language, as a structure, 
carries itself. Meaning is something contained in a text itself.  
Structuralism is thus the theory of coherence par excellence. “Ab-
hor”, “dislike” or “detest” may be transferred to the same cluster of 
interrelated signs. But the three words cannot replace each other in 
all instances. They belong to different discourses. “Residence” may 
                                           
 
75 True enough! The question though is whether language is just a system of 
signs. Husk at referere tilbage hertil i forbindelse med exagaration.  
76 Issues that permeates the entire dialogue Cratylus by Plato, Loeb Library, 




not make us think of house, but trigger images of upper class, 
wealth or perhaps tycoons. Just like “mind” belongs to “body”, 
while Vitalism does not.  
And should we replace say “residence” with “abode”, an entirely 
new discourse might occur, most likely a comic one. Just like “truth” 
– if the concept has any meaning at all – it may have many different 
connotations whether used in a court of law, a validity scheme or a 
text referring to or by Nietzsche. 
This thinking may lead one step further and state: Words have no 
fixed, perhaps not even a meaning in themselves; it all depends on 
context, and historical circumstance if you like,77 the idiom of post-
structuralism, please refer to FIGURE PSTRU. 
 
                                           
 
77 This is a hidden reference to Derrida and his refusal of the more “dictionary 




FIGURE STRU: VARIETIES OF STRUCTURALISM, illustrated. 
According to the classical version of Structuralism “man” is socio-culturally 
determined and thus “inherits” a set of standard ways of talking, discourses. 
According to post-structuralism everything is open for reinterpretation by the 
individual. 
 
The two words “Lady” and 
“Woman” occur in different 
contexts or discourses where 
they cannot replace each other 
without having an effect on 
the meaning of a whole 
section of text.78 
   “Lady” may not even refer 
to some of our own kind. 
Some may first of all recall a 
bitch drawn by W Disney, 
discourse L1. Others though 
will place it within the context 
of a novel of Elliot W2, etc. 
This also goes for woman, a 
word with a lot of 
connotations, depending on 
context.  
This is quite different from the categorization scheme of the Aristotelian syllo-
gistic discourse, which would categorize “ladies” as one of several subspecies 
of the general term for female: Women. Yet looking at discourses rather than in 
a strict Aristotelian categorization, there will be discourses where ladies and/or 
girls will be euphemisms for prostitutes.  
Post-structuralism states that context is not necessarily given, not even by genre, 
but has to be established by the reader himself. Accordingly we - as we read - 
re-creates the meaning of text at the cost of whatever the producer of the text 
may have expressed or intended of effect. And indeed some of us certainly use 
literature like that – for enlightenment and inspiration – rather than scholar-
ship! 
 
                                           
 




If we have no sense of the conventions governing a genre – like say 
positivist operationalist schemes for measuring or guidelines for 
reading poetry – we will either be bewildered by the string of 
words, dismiss it as meaningless or – if our drive to appear knowl-
edgeable overwhelms us – subject it to fit some scheme of ours, ac-
cording to the principle of magical cover up! 
Structuralism and the abandonment of ontology 
Speech may be a vehicle for human expression, but vocabularies set 
the conditions for our “giving voice”.79 Language uses us far more 
than we use it. Just like the technology of any period determines 
what we can do!  
If so, ontology is out. Reality appears to us as it is shaped by lan-
guage. It determines how and what we experience. – And with a 
grip on our mind of which we aren’t necessarily aware. It shapes us 
– a fact the previous text implicitly has referred to many times. 
This conception of language is easily extended to literary analysis 
and may even be radicalized further. Some even claim that language 
determines our desires, not just in the shape of commercials but by 
texts at large, novels and/or psychological essays, aspirations 
voiced by our parents at home at the kitchen table. Just an artifact 
like the Barbie Doll may be elevated to be the signifier of female at-
tractiveness. Dreams are shaped by the culture we are enmeshed in.  
Of course, we may now very well become suspicious when every-
thing is reduced to depending on one aspect, particularly when it is 
achieved through vagueness in terms of concretization and lack of 
predictive value. But let us stay on track. 
With ontology out of the way, the concept of the individual – so 
dear to Western Christianity – is washed down the drain along with 
the notion of the unconscious. Neither exists apart from being ex-
pressions that pop up in certain types or genres of discourse. 
                                           
 
79 Saussure is best known for his distinction between parole – speech as an 
object for study of expressions encountered during say field work and langue, 




Driven by its own inner logic the next step is easily taken: Seeing 
culture as a text, or even to see reality as a text, as proposed by Ri-
coeur.80 The world is as it appears to you as the text in a novel. Just 
as you yourself are a social construction! 
 
Structuralism dates back to a medieval scholastic tradition and has 
since acquired many forms. In its most simple form structuralism 
states that “man and his consciousness” is a product of prevailing 
social circumstances – of which some are identified as more influen-
tial than others. Thus language – in its widest sense – is seen as the 
enduring reality. 
Silently, with a force which we hardly recognize, vocabularies mark 
what is worth to be watching for. Words may open our eyes – and 
establish contact between writers of the past and ourselves. As well 
as drawing veils between ourselves and the perspectives we other-
wise might have applied. 
With reference to FIGURE PSTRU, we may remind ourselves about the 
difference between being a woman and being “assigned to the cate-
gory of female” and not as men are to man.81 Implicitly, in the nor-
mal English discourse as a flow of words, “being woman” is to be at 
the fringe of what public life implicitly ranks as normal, in contrast 
to Swedish where “man” as in mankind is “she”. 
We take a lot for granted. Especially social institutions like “de-
mocracy”, which the Western world apparently now, vis-à-vis the 
Islamic world, perceives as the natural state every society should 
adhere to. This even though no western society is democratic in any 
real sense, as for instance our industries are not even owned nor 
controlled by their employees. 
                                           
 
80 See for instance Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, (1981), 
Cambridge University Press 1995, page 140. 
81 Bronwyn Davies: Woman's Subjectivity and Feminist Stories, in Carolyn Ellis 




So the word “democracy”, as many other abstract concepts, is 
polysemical, please refer to page 46 <WP: Coming to Terms & 
Truth>. What it means grows out of a context. Thus, if reality is like 
a text, it may be up to us to construct the discourse we want to see, 
as poststructuralists like Derrida are eager to stress as a major tenet. 
 
To reject structuralism would be to deny and thus forsake the need 
for reflection as to how we are swallowed up by the language as 
well as the social norms we implicitly adhere to. But we may very 
well – as we will do later – look into whether it is the whole and 
nothing but the whole truth.  
First, I want to look at a particular present-day structuralist con-
ceptualization of particular relevance for social research in general 
and case research in particular: Institutionalism. 
Institutionalism 
Let us start with an example of how a Danish manufacturing com-
pany tried to encourage its operators to take part in process plan-
ning, etc. Amongst other initiatives, the production manager took a 
bright woman out of production and trained her in how to help her 
comrades identify areas in need of improvement. After some train-
ing, she was assigned the title of change agent and let loose on the 
work floor. As expected she soon became a great help according to 
both management and her colleagues. But after a few months she 
changed. She dressed up, became more stylish, did her hair better, 
applied a more elegant, subdued make-up, etc. She simply re-
sponded to her inner image of females in middle-managerial posi-
tions. The role had conquered her and in consequence she became 
less effective as a figure of identification for the workers! 
People strive to live up to or speculate in appearance. It is not just 
what is said that affects us.  Situational factors may also - although 
neither by force nor against “our will” - “determine” what we do. 
We often even enjoy conforming to what we would expect of our-
selves. Thus the proper word is not so much “determination” as 




Taking this scheme to the mid- or even grand-level, we encounter 
Institutionalism as a philosophy of organizational theory, sociology 
and economics. 
Institutionalism emphasizes the interplay between  
•  current social values and how they, according to circumstance, 
•  set  standards for appropriate behaviour – the stable society ap-
proach, and 
•  constrain and regulate behaviour legally – the social-realist per-
spective. 
As circumstances change, so does behaviour. Now, as industry can 
produce more than Western consumers can absorb, organizations 
are increasingly bound to use other means than merely the utility of 
their manufactured products to legitimize their existence in the eyes 
of a surrounding world. So, now organizations fight for our atten-
tion in order to publicly announce their concern for their sharehold-
ers, the environment, their employees, the local community as well 
as the unfortunate in the Third World.  
Such a tendency does not come out of the blue. One thing is that the 
game has changed from producing to selling. Small events may 
have an impact too. After scandals like Enron, a need emerged for 
decent companies to publicly stress how ethical their norms are. 
This may exemplify how Institutionalism while referring to mid-
level theories has a dynamic aspect of change associated with it. 
This way of thinking may thus inspire us to look at how current 
values structure our perception of the “natural”, primarily in terms 
of symbols, the cognitive dimension, and, secondly, how we are part 
of how they are shaped and change over time – the social construc-
tionist perspective. 
 
The very idea of “institutionalism” dates back to the dawn of mod-
ern sociology. Rational calculation does not do it alone, as many 
university economists seem to believe. Organizations – including 
manufacturing companies and public agencies – have to adapt to 
the changing norms of what is expected – and thus to the social cir-




leged founder of the Institutionalist School in the US, Veblen,82 
claimed that economics should be seen as an aspect of a culture and 
not as a system contained in itself.  
A truth familiar to any reader of Durkheim, Weber and Marx! Or, as 
my one-time teacher in economic teaching, Dr Edmund Stillman of 
the Hudson Research Institute in Paris, taught: Economy is an 
anthropological discipline, see also FIGURE ECO-TEN. 
 
                                           
 
82 Today Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) is best known for his book The Theory of 
the Leisure Class, (1902) Houghton Mifflin, 1973, where he introduced his 
highly moralistic concept ”conspicuous consumption”. While workers and 
engineers had a hard time surviving, the newly rich of the day liked to flaunt 
a wealth that often did not even build on their own industrial ingenuity but 
on making money grow. So they built grand estates and summer homes with 
more rooms than any family could need, while their idle, indolent ladies 
wasted money on absurd dresses, specially trained servants, etc. Economic 




FIGURE ECO-TEN: MAIN TENETS AND RESEARCH CONSEQUENCES OF 
INSTITUTIONALISM FOR ECONOMICS 
Major tenets of Institutionalism: 
Our historical, social and institutional environment shape how we act and 
what we take for granted 
Economic transactions are embedded in social and cultural processes, which 
most individuals just adapt to without hardly any reflections 
 
Consequently, economists should 
pay attention to the uniformities of custom, habit, and law as modes of orga-
nizing economic life rather than just mathematical modelling, as well as 
try to identify typical behavioural patterns of select elitist groups 
study the sources of potential clashes of interest in the existing social struc-
ture rather than concentrate on price and/or measure economic performance 
against some hypothetical norm 
And finally, 
Economic generalizations should specify the limits of culture and time to 
which they apply. 
 
Unfortunately, the Keynesian revolution drew most theorists of 
economics towards modelling. How this came about is another 
story, which we will have to pass over here. Instead, let me just 
dwell on one of the beauties of institutionalism:  
It outlines how case research may serve as a medium for making 
explicit the implicit rules that guide the lives of people in the work-
place, thus opening for scrutiny and thus even leading to partial 
emancipation. 
A last example of grandiose perception of the social  
Finally, let me just call to mind the most grandiose perception of the 
social I know of from the history of social research, namely Hegel’s 
idea that history is a deep, unfolding liberation movement. A vision 
that was to inspire the growth of Marxism, the idea in itself was in-





A few characteristics of interpretative practices across the board 
Grand-level perspectives are like seeing municipalities from the sky, 
cultures from satellites and nations through a reversed telescope: 
All-inclusive, sweeping outlines of patterns in which any detail is 
lost. And, unfortunately, opus operandi, too, are if not totally ig-
nored then at least rarely specifiable with any precision. 
Thus grand-level perspectives generally leave us with a dehuman-
ized worldview where our uniqueness as individuals – as you and 
“I” may imagine it – vanishes. As do statistics on the mid level. 
However discomforting this may be, and a challenge to our vanities, 
there is no reason for discarding them. Quite the opposite! To forego 
the very view that we are shaped by implicit routines, language and 
technologies would be to forego the very challenge of coming to our 
senses and paying attention to how and when it happens.  
 
The dividing line between the different types of interpretation may 
be hard to draw. Any social phenomenon – marriage, for example – 
may be rooted in many perspectives beyond the quasi-holy union of 
two people “I” personally experience it as. People, gobbled up by 
their image of objectivity and/or in debasing the social, may, how-
ever, reduce marriage to a utility function,83 a variant of legalized 
prostitution or an institutionalization of a biological drive for repro-
duction.  
Thus allow me to offer a rule of thumb for differentiation between 
the mid and grand level, as well as narrow and broad-span inter-
pretations:  
•  Whereas mid-level thinking thrives on postulating at best that 
“A might be B”, or at worst “A is just B”  
                                           
 
83 Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy: Social Economics, Belknap Press, 2000, 




•  Grand-level as well as broad-span interpretations often hinge on 
“A is nothing but B”.84 
Grand theories are hardly wrong in the sense that they state some-
thing completely out of touch with reality. Yet they tend to trans-
form what is partially true to the only truth. Everyday life and the 
sense of nuances we associate with social phenomena are ignored 
and, if considered, simplified. Love is more than just sex, more than 
just care for the family. It cannot merely be reduced to an inner 
drive of genes to reproduce themselves without violating the rich-
ness of existence. Just as the heart is more than just a pump! And if 
you dispute it, we all stand to lose a little. 
Main characteristics of span and levels in social research 
Let us finally try to summarize our identifications: 
 
Minute level 
•  Easily applicable principles based on observation in order to 
classify the behaviour of the Other.  
•  The applicability of minute-span characterizations may be sub-
stantiated by personal reflection and/or statistical enumeration. 
Mid level 
•  More abstract, yet simple claims for identifiable patterns of so-
cial trends working behind the manifest. 
•  Patterns may be verified temporarily by statistical enumeration 
and exemplified by illuminating examples. 
Grand level  
                                           
 
84 Refer for instance to the economist Ludwig von Mieses: “Money is nothing 
but a medium of exchange” in The Theory of Money and Credit (1934), Liberty 
Classics, 1980, page 34. Nonsense! Money is far more than that and primarily 




•  Essentially fundamentalist perspectives on the human condition 
generally taken for granted as the base of each school of 
research. 
•  Adherents should be able to illustrate the trustworthiness of the 
basic tenets by concrete examples. 
 
Independent of level, “span” defines the domains covered by a cho-
sen scheme of interpretation across a given level. Spans may thus 
purport to include 
•  a string of similar cases within a specified domain, or even 
•  several cases and/or lifestyles or cultures, or even 
•  to state what is valid across several scientific domains, explicitly, 
or at worst just implicitly assumed to be universally valid, 
•  or, even worse, span may not be considered at all! 
 
Whatever the level, interpretations generally have a base from 
which the key tenets are drawn as the primary foundation, be they  
•  psychological images and arguments – implicit or explicit 
•  biological, including reference to “need for survival” which ad-
mittedly occurs in many varieties such as power, drive for 
competence, lust, etc. 
•  mainly speculative, as for instance to build a worldview on 
some scheme of rationality. 
Typology of transfer of minute-level thinking to grand-level thinking and 
vice versa 
The following FIGURE EV/LEVIN tries to depict how concepts may be 






FIGURE EV/LEVIN: TRANSFERENCE OF IDEAS ACROSS LEVELS  
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personality of Sta-
lin to explain the 
horrors of Soviet 
Socialism 
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While concepts of interpretation – as shown - are transferred from 
one level to another, we might wonder whether it might be “a cate-
gory mistake” to do so? 
At least it must have consequences to mix them, e.g. to see France as 
embodied in a person or as an assemblage of several more or less 
self-conscious departments, governmental and private organiza-
tions. I grant that it may be enlightening to bestow human senti-
ments and reactions on nations. But at least I would expect that we 
do not do so without reflecting on what we – if so - are entranced in. 
To mix them may be a category mistake and yet still a powerful 




With the typology chosen here we get six variants for overexpansion 
of concepts to other levels. In the following we will briefly explore 
the advantages as well as costs of applying span to other levels in 
the four most radical versions. Please refer to FIGURE MIRANLEV, 
which prematurely indicates the conclusions we will reach.  
 
FIGURE MIRANLEV: CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFERRING SMALL AND 
GRAND PERSPECTIVES TO OTHER LEVELS  
 

























Applying minute-level attributions to grand levels of aggregation 
A favoured trick of the News is to present political events as if they 
were the outcome of the thoughts and personal traits of key political 
figures. During the recent Balkan genocides, Milosevic's presumed 
sinister personality was used to make sense of what really was hard 
to interpret and even more difficult to explain. And even worse, 
many such expositions even attributed him with traits of character 
that embodied the presenter’s perception of the history of Serbia. 
This example shows how inappropriate and offending it is, espe-
cially to the sensitivity of mid-level theorists, to interpret highly-ag-
gregated political events by minute means as if the domains covered 
by Institutionalism do not count. Of course they do, the problem is 




“A country should be governed as a big business” is a popular ex-
ample for expanding mid-level thinking to society. I grant you that 
few social researchers would make such a claim, as they are per-
fectly aware that the multitude of goals having to be honoured – 
particularly in democracies – makes political governance differ from 
private governance, although many governmental institutions in 
their own right share many managerial principles with private en-
terprises. Thus, if a country is seen as nothing but a big firm, you 
stand to lose your sense of some of the vital differences in dimen-
sion! 
Over-extending the span of perspective  
Economic thinking, grounded in a rationalist paradigm, offers a 
scheme for interpretation according to which every man will seek to 
optimize his own welfare as best he can. What counts, thus, are our 
goals, the information we possess and what resources we control, 
etc.  
This may sound reasonable enough. Yet, on closer inspection, the 
position is fraught with difficulty. Why do monks struggle with 
their inner drives in order to live in celibacy, why do freedom fight-
ers risk their lives and why do mothers starve in order to feed their 
babies? Oh, the economist may insist, this is indeed due to their 
goals. If so the paradigm is empty as it can be used to “explain” any 
behaviour. Whether I beat my wife or not will thus be due to what 
gives me the most pleasure. How convenient. But the snag is, of 
course, that something has to happen before we can vouch for a 
cause. Thus any such alleged explication may merely be a rhetorical 
scam. We do not know! 
Yet in a certain way the scheme may make sense. Can anyone be 
expected to really act against his own interests? Well, that is up to 
you to decide. But if not, ethical behaviour must by implication be a 
misnomer.85 The rationalist paradigm is simply too abstract to be 
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trustworthy. But it is, of course, this very lack of concreteness that 
allows its applicants to drum up an answer no matter the situation. 
Yet the idea of “optimization of one’s self-interest” is not entirely 
unfounded. Yet as long as we are not told what a certain group of 
people want to optimize and why, we lose the very foundation for 
grasping their behaviour as well as evaluating as rational. Transfer-
ring a minute-level perspective to mid-level theories is an overex-
pansion of a concept, which - as illustrated - may easily lead to a 
loss or impoverishment of dimensions. 
Others pass perspectives from the mid to the grand level for in-
stance by stating that as the weather changes so do politics, or claim 
the Darwinist predator imaginary to be the all-encompassing para-
digm for the social. The first is obviously too abstract to specify 
anything, the latter too vulgar. Of course we share a lot of physical 
features. But if you claim something to be empirically valid for all 
humans as social beings, you are beyond seeing us as we perceive 
ourselves. As individuals, that is! And likewise, if you believe 
something to be demonstratively valid for any human institution, 
the price to pay is once again your sense of the concrete.  
But yes, I grant you that in the abstract everything may be made to 
appear alike.  
Are we then left with a disjointed universe of social theories? 
As just demonstrated, it appears as if we cannot see across span and 
level and thus grasp the essence of being a person with a family and 
a job in a given society. And this is indeed our very condition, ac-
cording to the Philosophy of Perspectivism. A great challenge to 
which we will turn shortly! But first we have to take a glance at the 
dynamics of interpretation within social research.  
Dynamics of interpretation 
After this cursory mentioning of exemplary types of interpretations, 
let us take a general look at some of their significant characteristics, 




An illustration of what subjectivist interpretations entail 
Later we return to explanatory statements but for now let us briefly, 
once more, illustrate what interpretation entails with these re-
sponses:  
•  “She hit Peter as she had grown increasingly impatient with her 
boy” Why? “He kept on answering back, so she simply 
surrendered to an inner urge to hit him”! 
•  “Why did they marry?” “Oh they were so much in love!” 
Such claims are dressed up to appear as explanations, but are in-
deed interpretative in what we have already termed the subjectivist 
mode, refer to page 12. Without further ado they expand one possi-
ble cause to be the only one. Not all impatient mothers respond to 
teasing by beating their children, nor do all youngsters in love 
marry. It is just a possibility.  
Just to state a reason for an occurrence is to offer an interpretation 
you expect us to accept. And, certainly, hitting children is bad, but 
doing it without reason is even worse. And, certainly, marriage is a 
sign we hopefully can read as an expression of two persons’ loving, 
mutual commitment. But it need not be so. “Time” will show. 
What triggers an action may be different from what we suppose and 
so may the outcome. And if we do not get closer and follow up our 
interpretations we will never know! But that is exactly what we ex-
pect researchers to do. A check and outline of opus operandi! If not, 
the explication we offer may not be more than just an utterance. This 
exemplifies the elementary type of a minute-level, over-expanded 
interpretation:  
 
A sequence of behaviours has been observed,  
•  which then is interpreted as acts: something a person does de-
liberately by choice. 
•  Yet for something to be an action, we must be able to present 
images, primarily in words, that enable others to recognize what 




•  At best, although not necessarily in practice, the application of 
the identified drivers has to be substantiated by reference to 
opus operandi. 
The more evidence behind any claim, the more convincing it is! 
True! But in general we do not bother. Without further ado most 
people will subjectively accept that the man spotted at the corner 
eating a doughnut is hungry. Yet it may easily go too far; as is the 
case with the images of reality experienced by Don Quixote – the 
epitome of ideologically grounded interpretation. Yet we should not 
reject Don Quixote offhand with a chuckle. To him as well as to us it 
is often almost as though we need to find or at least invent a con-
ceptual scheme to show others that we know what is going on. Sel-
dom arbitrarily, but founded on personal experience and, yes, 
reading! 
The world does not look the same to the depressed as to those in 
love. Both may construct their own distorted conceptualisations of 
trivial incidents. A lover my read a smile as a promise, while to the 
depressed it awakes a sense of loss: Now he is mocked once more 
for being a failure.86  
So interpretations may be the result of an overzealous activity of 
wanting to make the world around us fit our preconceived notions 
of it. At times subjectivism even falls within the category of compul-
sory behaviour – something we do in order to calm our own anxiety 
of not knowing, to make the world appear intelligible to others and 
– if we can convince them – in turn ourselves. Excellent! In this way 
we are able to fill out gaps in our conceptual grasp of the world 
without even recognizing it. Or even as an opportunity to feed our 
already deranged minds!  
We must have reasons for what others, including ourselves, do, and 
for some such reasons have to be rationalized. On the other hand, if 
challenged, most of us do recognize that our lives – oh sorry – the 
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lives of others are dominated by inner drives, lust, agonies, search 
for being swallowed up in enjoyment, care for and commitment to 
causes, including the maintenance of our self-image, refer to FIGURE 
YY, below. 
I have often wondered why we so readily jump to interpretations 
rather than admitting that we do not really know what is happening 
but are ready to search for insight. Believing oneself to be ignorant is 
one of the great methodological principles of case research in the 
explorative integrative mood. 
 
FIGURE YY: INTERPRETATION AS IDENTIFICATION OF HIDDEN REALITIES 
BENEATH THE MANIFEST 
 
Our interpretative pat-
terns, schemata as some 
call them, give us 
guidelines by which to 
evaluate all social mani-
festations as well as an 
identification of the 
foundation and thus 
images of the potential 
powers working inside 
us beneath the manifest 
 
The move from a subjectivist to a more self-conscious interpretative stand 
In the subjectivist mode interpretation is simply to give oneself 
away to a sense of knowing why someone acts like she does. The 
self-conscious interpreter, though, and thus hopefully any researcher, 
will be aware how she – as an observant - is interpreting. If so she 
will simultaneously: 
•   Be aware what – to her as an observer - appears as manifest 
may “just” be due to the clues she herself looks for.  
•  Tentatively wonder which inner movements may be at work be-




•  While she herself tries to recognize how she herself too may be 
captivated by language as well as the interpretation schemes 
brought to her during her upbringing, education and/or emo-
tional scars. 
Discovering a hidden reality, the essence of interpretation 
Through the millenniums the “Will of Gods” was the accepted 
grand principle for explication. Any organized religion teaches the 
same: The ultimate reality is not bounded by what we can see and 
touch. And now mundane scientists too have taken the same torch 
to search for unifying principles beneath the apparent confusion of 
everyday occurrences, be it sexual drive, self-preservation, anxiety 
and/or power. 
Visualizations of “hidden realities” on a broad scale are as bountiful 
as the variation of human make-belief, social schools of thought and 
religions. And we now even have a paradigm for it: Newton’s three 
basic laws covering all sorts of movements that are discernable by 
the naked eye in our sunlit Universe. 
Believing in the ability to identify what drives people extends itself 
to include “reading” the “hidden” strategies behind the upcoming 
election behind New Labour's campaign, US foreign policy, the 
forces behind the breakthrough of the Renaissance, and the capacity 
of student of religions to give an outline of the essence of Buddhism. 
Of course, any such rhetoric may be as much a means of responding 
to an inner call for greater self-esteem as self-consciousness. So let us 
look at how the practices of interpretation may be presented as an 
oscillation between two horns:  
•  From exaggeration and simplification to  







Interpretation in itself means becoming master of something 
Nietzsche87 
The right, more pointed horn 
Exaggeration  
The drive to search for a unifying principle has tempted even the 
most talented to postulate they discovered what might be at work as 
soon as they detected one drive, be it power, greed, sexual lust, rec-
ognition, etc. And certainly, the best of such “inventors” are worth 
reading exactly due to their one-sidedness. Thus they expand:  
•  Making what has been accepted as valid within one domain to 
cover a far greater span of cases or even domains.  
Or even stronger: 
•  Making what has been found to be partially true the only truth. 
Yet, we have to remind ourselves what may be at stake here. Exag-
geration is driven by emotion. It is all right to have detected how 
unfulfilled sexual desire may contribute to functional disorder, or 
how a manager is driven by a need to nourish his self-image; as well 
as identify how dysfunctional this may be. Fine! But this does not in 
itself allow the inventor of such images, and even less his followers, 
to make this the only truth and denying other views any relevance. 
In both cases one probable drive is extended to be the only one. A 
move in the mode of self-importance you, if a Jungian, will name 
inflation. 
Simplification 
Exaggeration goes hand in hand with simplification.88 Be it not in 
consequence then at least as an approach. Exaggeration may be ex-
perienced as self-confidence and yet express a need for a “walking 
stick”. Still, as a new perspective for interpretation given to us, it 
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may intrigue and guide us to take an enlightening new look at what 
we usually take for granted.   
“Feminist research” may here serve as an excellent example: It in-
spires us to look around in a certain way. And if you do, you will 
see more dominance patterns than you may ever have been aware 
of. By this I do not claim that we should analyse all human as well 
as industrial relations as mere power relations! That would exem-
plify simplification! But it is worth watching for as one facet of or-
ganizational life! 
Where exaggeration leads the way, simplification follows: One per-
spective is claimed to be the only valid one. The consequences of 
several of such “A is nothing but B” broad-span agendas have led to 
a narrowing of research programmes as well as to a desensitizing of 
students who thus were persuaded to ignore vast dimensions of life 
as relevant for study.  
Or, as we shall see in the next chapter on Explanation, simplification 
may at times be formulated in opposition to its likewise exaggerated 
claims of its forerunners. Like behaviourism, for instance, – exclud-
ing emotions and self-report as legitimate domains for study – was a 
response to the exalted claims of romantic philosophy and its rival, 
psychoanalysis. 
Some examples 
Simplifications in terms of ignoring relevant dimensions are abun-
dant and we have already referred to some in the previous chapters: 
The redundancy theory of truth, refer to page 77 <WP: Coming to 
Terms & Truth>, claims: “To state: “It is true that ‘aRb’ is a rhetorical 
trick”. The statement is no different than just stating “aRb”. And this 
may seem so as far as the content is concerned. Yet they certainly do 
not have the same meaning, refer to FIGURE TTMEAN.  
It is good to be told “Jesus is our Saviour”. But by stating that “It is 
certainly true that Jesus is our Saviour”, you add something beyond 
giving some information: You express how you put yourself, your 
pay cheque, your sanity at stake as a personal guarantee that Jesus is 




To claim something to be “true” is to express an existential guaran-
tee. In this light, the claim that “true” is merely a redundant enforcer 
thus becomes a tactless simplification. It simply ignores our willing-
ness to personally vouch for something.  
Yet for an analytical philosopher the simplification has its advan-
tages. It makes him appear far cleverer than the man in the street 
with his willingness to make the best out of his beliefs by thought-
less swearing. So, “knowing” comes at a price. “You” boost your 
own academic ego by denying existential dimensions in other peo-
ple’s life.  
Unfortunately, academics may make careers from it! 
 
We have also seen how the young Wittgenstein claimed that scien-
tific language must mirror reality, refer to page 43-4 <WP: Coming 
to Terms & Truth>. Later, though, he claimed that the meaning of 
words was given by their position in language. Thus he went from 
one extreme – correspondence – to the other – coherence. Stretching 
the span of one aspect too far, others are erased. So, while both po-
sitions are useful as reminders for analysis, insisting on either will 
lead to a loss of all the other potential dimensions of what state-
ments might mean as well as express.  
One important point though: Could there be situations in which 
either of Wittgenstein's two claims actually does cover practice? If 
we look closely, there will be some. The going and coming of trains 
has to be handled as scheduled, if the train timetables are to have 
any value. And what to do, when we meet a new construct, say 
“Structuralization Theory”? Well, you may look for a definition. 
That gives you a hint about what it's about. Yet, you will still not 
know how to use the term until you have become acquainted with 
when and how people you trust use it. And if you do it anyway, 
misunderstandings are bound to occur.  
Social constructivism, however complicated as a mental imaginary, 
may easily be seen as an example of exaggerated simplification. Its 
basic claim – that our worlds are human constructions – stands to be 
believed. Of course, language came from our forefathers, as did 




people refer to. Even natural wilderness is man-made. It would no 
longer be there without our guardianship and protection.  
And our thoughts? Maybe they are not exactly created by language, 
but they would be unthinkable without. So, social constructivism 
certainly cannot be refuted.  
Yet there are worlds within us that are not just anchored in conven-
tions but rooted in our nature as religious beings, human mammals, 
and/or biological entities. We experience it, for example, when the 
ordinary language falls short and we have to resort to drawing, 
gesture, emotional expression or meditative dancing in order to 
make what we sense intelligible to ourselves.  
Rewards of exaggeration 
 and simplification of the “cult of the interesting”89 
The rewards of exaggeration through simplification are indeed 
gratifying, provided you can get away with it. It allows you to ap-
pear wiser than ordinary people as if you know what really matters: 
Admiration for political leadership! Ha, it is all just a question of 
power! Romantic love! Oh you fool, that is just another expression 
of MDC, mental disorder complex. As you like, “you” may choose 
the simplification you fancy in order to reduce the personal 
experience of the Other to a need for being in control, biological 
need, utility or “lack of rationality”. 
Theorists may thus acquire their name not for stating the truth, but 
for saying something that stimulates our interest. First by attacking 
and negating an otherwise accepted theory. Next to outline a new 
way of looking at the world. And the success will be the greater the 
better the new way of thinking lends itself to easy schemes for 
practising it. Like Freud, who showed that dreams, which the 
“wise” of his day hitherto had considered as meaningless, are 
indeed not so. So now dreams are messages from a world within us 
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that ordinary language and customs shield from us.90 Or like Marx, 
who a hundred years ago showed how the wheels of history 
worked beneath the otherwise meaningless struggles of working 
life.  
These approaches of “the world is not just as it appears” are drawn 
from the same well as organized religion. Reality may even be the 
opposite of what it appears to be: For instance what is experienced 
as pleasure is really sinful. Thus the popular, often copied picture by 
Hieronymus Bosch: “Garden of Delight”91 may “really” be a presen-
tation within the vanity tradition of painting. Just as we recently 
have learned how the seeming chaos of natural phenomena may be 
structured by fractal geometrics. 
Many issues are at work here. Let's mention some of the most 
prominent:92 
•  The ability of the expert to transform what to us seems to be a 
local, unrelated phenomenon into a general one;  
•  to detect how what seems to be a phenomenon without much 
functional utility is really an expression of an effectivity if fur-
ther looked into;  
•  to demonstrate that what seems to be unrelated is really a set of 
interdependent phenomena. 
In all cases the way is cleared for the expert – as well as the layman 
who wants to appear as such – to show that beneath the common-
sense world of appearance is a deeper, more persuasive world we 
unknowingly share with other people or even creatures. 
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For the sake of completeness we may recall that research also has 
other attention catchers. Sometimes a striking case may settle a de-
bate on doctrines with heavy political perspectives, as when Marga-
ret Mead presented her idyllic image of native life in Samoa – which 
was taken to “prove” that education, not biology, was the deter-
mining factor for human behaviour.93  
 
Do listen to everyone searching for truth,  
but do leave them the moment they declare they found it 
The master focus  
Yet to be really successful as a master scientist, it is not enough just 
to draw attention to a new perspective. The seer or at least his first 
followers have to find a scheme for systemizing it across selected 
layers, refer to Figure DDR, page 69 <WP: Coming to Terms & 
Truth>. Next, newcomers to the field must be given a tool to use. 
The new perspective has to be professionalized, as has been exem-
plified, refer to Figure BF, page 18, by the conversion of Freud’s 
German concepts into the English language of psychoanalysis! Thus 
a new language is created for detecting signs of forces lurking be-
neath the obvious, which the master student knows how to make 
intelligible to the rest of us. If the truth uncovered is somewhat 
banal though, the obvious avenue towards fame is to create an 
elaborate vocabulary as a cover-up.  
We may, and I think we should, be fascinated by new perspectives. 
Whether we should let ourselves be drawn into it or to fight it is up 
to our personal choice. Hopefully, there will be somebody around to 
encourage our conscientious awareness of our own tendencies to 
both be blind to as well as attracted to perspectives which could 
help us paint a fuller picture of life. Thus the path is cleared for a 
look at the other, more playful horn, but first we must touch upon 
the philosophy of Perspectivism. 
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 “Everything is subjective”, you say.  
This is an interpretation! The “subject” is not something given.  
It is something added, invented and projected behind what there is. 
Nietzsche94 
 
What we see is misconceived, limited views of the world.  
Everything is a lie. Truth in particular! 
Perspectivism – promotion of illusions or deeper insights 
As far as we consciously acknowledge we construct images of what 
we see and grasp – of the manifest or hidden – we could have a 
sense of how we do so.  
In reality – excuse the pun – most of what we believe is as much in-
ferred and construed by language as by sense of being. Thus – in 
this interpretation – the “reality” we know is not “the world as 
such”, not even partially. It might be and it might be made up in 
countless other ways – be they more or less inclusive, coherent ways 
or obstacles to a good life. 
Perspectivism – creating, choosing or being led to a perspective 
Perspectivism is generally the doctrine that states that the validity of 
any sentence is relative to the school of thought in which it is 
imbedded. So the truth of any statement is determined relative to 
the perspective of which it is a part.95 Advocates of such an extreme 
constructivism further enhance this relativism by claiming that any 
researcher is entitled to his views. Thus the only standard others 
might apply to a text is “internal coherence”. Researchers should 
thus merely state their premises and then call for it to be judged 
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within the standards of say, logical positivism, Weber's sociology or 
the ethos of Nietzsche's writings on Perspectivism.96  
To accept, for instance, a theistic rather than a scientific world view 
is thus just to give priority to one way of interpretation. Very de-
mocratic! lf so, you can safely get away with whatever simplifying 
or exaggerating procedures of the discipline you have surrendered 
to. And any potentially disturbing pressure from reality can thus be 
passed over in silence.  
So – as I see it - Perspectivism is an ideology not for free. The con-
scious cultivation of a particular way of thinking may initially 
nourish certain sensitivities of yours. But in the longer run insensi-
tivity to others will be the price you have to pay for sticking to any 
over-expanded theoretical truth. 
Choice, necessity or seduction 
When we look not just upon ourselves but others, it is easy to claim 
we each choose our own ways of interpretation be it according to 
rules we adhere to or not. This triggers several questions:  
•  How much does interpretation include?  
•  Is there something to rely on, other than our own subjectivity?  
•  Do we really choose, and if so, how is this possible?  
•  Or are we led to interpretation? And if so, how and when? 
We will only cast a glance at these issues in the following. But I urge 
everyone to explore these issues for their own sake. 
The fight for the last word 
The problem with Perspectivism is not that it encourages us to stress 
a particular angle. That may indeed be a) educational, refer to figure 
VALPER below, b) and may make us pause and look at aspects we 
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previously might have neglected and c) ask ourselves what led us to 
do so. 
The problem arises when researchers turn defensive and suppress 
other and occasionally even richer forms of insights, as, e.g., when 
statisticians turn against qualitative studies; or even give away to “a 
tendency to reduce one's opponents to caricatures”97 and in turn 
make any position of the “other” even more radical. Thus the partial 
one-sidedness is as much a mirror as a window. Thus, we may ask: 
What is so frightening about the views we find ourselves called to 
emotionally refute? 
                                           
 




FIGURE VALPER: STANDARDS FOR PERSPECTIVISM  
 











OF WHAT IS 
IDENTIFICATION 
1.1 
EMPHASIS ON WHAT 
MATTERS 
Identification of facts as 
data may be selective but 
has to have some relation 
to occurrences in the field 
 
GENERATION OF DATA 
1.2 
INTERESTING 
Data”-processing must be 
exciting in the sense that 
it is has to present data in 





SEARCHING FOR  
WHOLES AND/OR 
CREATING MEANING 




Demand for a transparent 
logic – however exclusive 
– of which facts to select 






Can the results be used to 
increase the awareness of 
alternative interpretations 
of everyday occurrences 
and/or a potential new 
world 
The move from 1.1 -> 1.2 may be based on exampling: finding the right inci-
dents relevant to the point you wish to make and excluding points that may be 
an embarrassment. 
2.1 Interpretations create a sense of “getting to know”; building coherence thus 
serves as an argument to prove how right it is. Yet this cannot fend off the un-
certainty caused by reality pressure, thus all interpretative systems have to bol-
ster their stand with protective layers of defensive logic.  
 
                                           
 




Unfortunately, the academic world is infested with a will to fight for 
the last word rather than getting around and to the bottom of an is-
sue. And although I personally may be fascinated by one-sided 
views, as a case researcher I am disgusted. There is a vast difference 
between enjoying a fight in the ring and hearing that someone was 
beaten up in the street. Just as one may be horrified by listening in 
on the battles fought in a courtroom as occasional caricatures of 
truth-seeking. 
When the veil of subjectivity becomes more important than what it hides 
Even worse than fighting for your own position – which you may be 
tempted to do in order to bolster it – is the joy some find in produc-
ing infamies of the works of, e.g., Freud and others. With this in 
mind let us proceed to the delight in playing with interpretative 
schemes: 
The left horn, in all seriousness the more playful approach 
Any discussion between two combatants each aiming to refute the 
relevance of each view of the ”Other” may be fun to watch, but most 
likely satisfying to none.  
Nor do opponents necessarily meet on the same level. For instance, 
supervisors often instruct their students first of all to frame a re-
search question, then state their position and choose a perspective. 
Or, worse still, some supervisors are more than willing to impose 
their favourite perspective on the student. Why? Wouldn't it be 
more proper to leave it to the student to explore the subject at hand, 
experiment with different perspectives and even encourage him to 
try to unite them, or, even better, to help him detect or even develop 
new ones?  
Or couldn't we – at least during fieldwork – take in different per-
spectives in order to sensitize ourselves to what the world looks like 
according to more than one perspective? Or we may even – as we 
will illustrate in the final chapter on Understanding – learn the art of 
dialogue – where both parts are prepared to help each other clarify 




face. But let us first here look at the challenge of experimenting with 
perspectives. 
Going beyond the obvious, making something implicit explicit 
Rousseau's literary career started with a prize-winning essay for the 
Academy of Dijon, 1750. In this he – in contrast to prevailing opin-
ions – made the claim that the progress within arts and sciences 
since the Renaissance had neither improved the mental nor the 
emotional life of man. According to legend, his first inclination had 
been to praise progress, yet Diderot99 advised the young man to 
present the opposite view if he wanted to make a name for himself. 
He obliged and made a success for life from it.  
Yet, arousing interest by twisting habits of thinking around may at 
best be far more than a trick. In realist terms it could be an opening 
towards seeing beyond the obvious – as language leads us to see – 
and detecting forces working inside us more or less behind our own 
back. Freud's psychoanalysis, Marx' political visions and Structur-
alism have all been enlightening: All created by a master of un-
masking who made a name for themselves for having been if not the 
first to see beyond the obvious then for doing so in a far greater de-
tail than anyone before them. 
Yet any scheme of unmasking appearances must, in order to gain credi-
bility, be nurtured by a sense within “me” that we partly are subject 
to forces  
•  we are too embarrassed to recognize – be it lust or negative emo-
tions such as envy and pride, running counter to social decency, 
or 
•  of language, with its both limited and directive vocabulary, 
which up till now or perhaps even still has such a grip on us that 
we are unable to express ourselves authentically. 
The very idea of hidden forces will always embarrass if not outright 
offend some; like present-day believers in a materialist universe are 
                                           
 




insulted by the very idea of creationist teaching. But let us keep in 
mind that sciences too are likely to instruct us that the world of ap-
pearance is grounded in processes that are not even detectable to the 
naked eye. The Sun does not circle the Earth, matter is not solid but 
built of atoms, just as our biological heritage is grounded in genes of 
which most of us only know of by hearsay, refer to Figure DDR2, a 
continuation of the previous Figure DDR.- 
On a far more modest scale, one of the virtues of case research is 
actually to unravel the rules that seemingly guide the behaviour of 
different groups of employees. Or with a catchword:  Making the im-





FIGURE DDR2:  
VARIOUS DOMAINS OF REALITY, SENSED OR IMAGINED 







realities we talk about,realities we sense, might sense and the 
underlying reality 
 
   
Our conceptions of the world are derived from the pressure of the outside world 
on our senses and our receptivity. Furthermore, it is coloured by our emotions 
shaped by the inferences and the language we master. Far the greater part of 
what is happening within, to or around us just passes us by without being con-
sciously noticed and is thus hidden for us like, e.g., the functions of our organs or 
decisions made by others.  
Thus one might have an inner image of at least four layers:  
At the “top” the intellectual level with the thought patterns, which we recognize 
and identify as ours, whether we appreciate them or not. This realm of acquired 




as in experience.  
Next a level of conscious expression, language and integrated recall! What we say 
we know about what the world is like; “The adapted world which we feel to be 
the real one”, as Nietzsche calls it.100 
Yet it is not all that we observe that we process. Yet we know it – e.g. the colour of 
the surface of a lake or of a tree trunk may be relevant to people with another pro-
fession than ours. In general we do not see much point in paying attention to the 
small talk of people passing by either. We need language to help us focus as we 
sense far more than we have any interest in or perhaps even the ability to name.  
Yet a great part of what we do not notice is noticeable in principle. We just do not 
attach any importance to it.  
Beyond that, there is a level where outer occurrences as well as inner emotions 
trigger manifest reactions, although what is happening is beyond our observa-
tional abilities.  
 
And a detour – from openness to new rigidities 
The early Freud could very well stand out as an ideal for us all with 
his acute awareness of the implicitly expressive content of his utter-
ances, like slips of tongue.101 And so, too, when he in his mid-career 
– much to his own surprise – found that suppressed sexuality could 
be the source of dysfunctional behaviours. Yet from then on, he saw 
this complex at work everywhere. Creative awareness was thus later 
stifled into dogmatism. This was strengthened as he related sexual 
drive to procreation, and thus biology, which reduced his overall 
venture to a subject of natural science rather than social research.  
To us, though, this identification of the consequences of repressed 
sexuality as the cause of self-destructive behaviour may very well 
best be understood within late-Victorian norms. Any particular 
truth may – no matter how well it is backed by evidence – be truer 
in certain ages than others!  
                                           
 
100 Nietzsche: The Will to Power (1883-88) § 567-9. 
101 Sigmund Freud: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), Standard 




Of course, in any case, we had better listen to the words of the 
Masters, yet without necessarily letting ourselves be absorbed in 
them. Just as much attention need to be given to opus operandi. We 
would learn so much more by exploring the genesis of their 
writings, as well as their limits rather than letting ourselves be 
swallowed up. In short, we had better try to maintain our 
sensitivity. 
Perspectivistic accounts are at times amusing and even enjoyable to 
read, particularly if they have an artistic nerve. Or they may be 
boring, as the claim for the right of being a perspectivist may be  
•  an alibi for being sloppy, 
•  a right to indulge in projections, 
•  a necessity to humour some reference group, e.g. a supervisor or  
•  an obligation to devote oneself to politically contorted under-
takings, as e.g. was the case with conflict sociology and other 
“theory first” thinking schemes. 
The latter issue called on Glaser and Strauss to advocate a grounded 
“data first approach.”102 Yet abstaining from devotion to a certain 
theoretical perspective only by implication will make you de-
pendent on your personal dispositions! 
Do not let yourself be fooled, when play can be serious fun! 
The better alternative is to make interpretation something you have 
fun playing with as you try to come to terms with your informants, 
what they attempt to do, as well as what they say they restrain 
themselves from doing. This may in turn increase your sensitivities 
and in turn even make you “see” yourself better.  
Reality is rich and at times even richer than we have the imagination 
to encompass. 
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Some personal examples of playing 
Allow me to illustrate how we may look for and experiment with 
different practices of interpretation. During fieldwork you may be 
confronted with different viewpoints of practices that people share 
or witness within their organization.  
Traditionally, managers and workers blame each other for mis-
doings. Management claims that most workers resist change – with-
out wondering why they may do so in the first place. And workers 
perceive management as a greedy bunch of self-interested persons 
that rather should help and pay due attention to the efforts on the 
floor. In such a situation the explorative fieldworker may experi-
ment with the prevailing interpretations she has identified within 
the organization. Look for clues that can confirm either party's per-
ceptions of the other.  
During my exploration of Employee Ownership I returned to do 
fieldwork at a nut and bolt company, Fastener. Here, as I saw it, the 
management was highly sensitive, attentive and instructive in their 
relations with their operators. Yet, one person, a storage worker, 
originally trained as a biologist, had his own views. He stuck to a 
vulgar-Darwinist view of seeing management as predators on the 
good will of employees.  
I had all the reasons I could want to reject his view. But I reasoned 
otherwise. Some readers of my upcoming report – conflict sociolo-
gists for instance – would certainly try to apply the same scheme 
and perhaps even accuse me of being a naïve researcher infested 
with a bourgeois perspective. Thus to forestall any criticism and 
keep my mind open to other possibilities of interpretation, I, for two 
days, searched for clues – however tiny – that could affirm the 
“predator” view.  
A procedure I cannot recommend enough. It is an intensive and 
very rewarding procedure, both when the outcome forces one to 
partly reject any initial interpretation or to sharpen it – please refer 
to analytical generalization, page 19-27<WP : In Case of Case Re-
search>.  
A second example: After getting married I tried to copy the ways in 




enjoyable and led me to have a far more relaxed and supporting re-
lationship with women.  
There is only one reality, but we live within each our own 
There is only one reality, but we live within each our own. A fact we 
may recognize. Or do we? – Perhaps just in theory! If yes, we would 
be fascinated by the multitude of experiences people refer to as the 
reason for their attitudes. 
Different interpretations of society, group behaviour and the rela-
tions between man and his world are abundant. I am sure that you 
do not find them all equally useful. We may even agree that some 
are outright erroneous, some amusing and others delirious or even 
harmful. Yet we cannot deny that they have had their exponents. 
And that should intrigue us so that instead of rejecting what we are 
unwilling to grasp, we should embark on a quest to develop our 
grasp of why and under what circumstances who turns to what 
perspective. Some adherents of a given view may even have been 
acutely aware how their one professed perspective is not the only 
possible one. 
By implication this is a rejection of the ethos of Perspectivism. There 
may be a multitude of language-created worlds. Yet they may not be 
equally healthy to live by. Thus we are morally obligated con-
tinuously to identify, explicate and test those interpretations we ad-
here to in order to arrive, step by step, at a more complete world-
view. 
This line of thought paves the way towards Understanding as a 
mode of life in general. But first we have to deal with a dramatic 
wholesale rejection of interpretation in social research: the explana-
tory approach. 
The present text 
The reader might now ask whether I am aware of which minute-, 
mid- and grand-level assumptions I cling to, or to which degree “I” 
may overextend my views. Well, let me be modest: As a case re-
searcher I have more than once experienced being unaware of my 




tinue to listen in order to sense what may be at work in worlds be-
yond language. 
Secondly, as a working principle, I try to approach any new scheme 
of thought – however extreme or overextended – expecting it to 
contain a kernel of truth worth noticing! So I do acknowledge the 
truth of conflict sociology, yet without letting myself be sucked into 
it. And, certainly, structuralism is even better grounded, yet I try not 
to live by it, devoted as I am to sensing feelings and imaginations, 
which may be difficult to express in plain language! 
Thirdly, as we are not accountable for what we feel, we may not 
know why we act as we do. Nevertheless I nurture the existentialist 
credo that we are responsible for how we cope with our inclinations, 
what we do, and, thus, for our choices. Thus the problem with the 
ethos of Structuralism is not that it is wrong, but that it is a chal-
lenge to the ideal of self-governance. We will explore these issues in 
some detail in the last chapter on Understanding. First, however, we 
have to turn to the historically far greater challenge to oust inter-
pretation from social research, its self-proclaimed counterpart: Ex-
planation. 
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